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ABSTRACT
RODNEY OWENS. Securing the data storage and processing in Cloud Computing
Environment. (Under the direction of DR. WEICHAO WANG)
Organizations increasingly utilize cloud computing architectures to reduce costs and en-
ergy consumption both in the data warehouse and on mobile devices by better utilizing
the computing resources available. However, the security and privacy issues with publicly
available cloud computing infrastructures have not been studied to a sufficient depth for or-
ganizations and individuals to be fully informed of the risks; neither are private nor public
clouds prepared to properly secure their connections as middle-men between mobile de-
vices which use encryption and external data providers which neglect to encrypt their data.
Furthermore, cloud computing providers are not well informed of the risks associated with
policy and techniques they could implement to mitigate those risks.
In this dissertation, we present a new layered understanding of public cloud comput-
ing. On the high level, we concentrate on the overall architecture and how information
is processed and transmitted. The key idea is to secure information from outside attack
and monitoring. We use techniques such as separating virtual machine roles, re-spawning
virtual machines in high succession, and cryptography-based access control to achieve a
high-level assurance of public cloud computing security and privacy. On the low level,
we explore security and privacy issues on the memory management level. We present a
mechanism for the prevention of automatic virtual machine memory guessing attacks.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
With the nature of the modern economy, it is becoming increasingly important to min-
imize the costs of a computing infrastructure. Organizations are looking to do more with
less, by making management easier with less man-power, while decreasing the total cost
of ownership associated with service oriented computing resources. Due to these con-
straints, organizations are increasingly turning to cloud-computing resources. Since the
early 2000’s, Cloud computing is often a vague term that is gaining popularity. It is im-
portant to pin down what, precisely, is being discussed when the term ‘cloud computing’
is used, in order to effectively discuss the importance of this technological trend in today’s
world. Currently, the trend is to describe cloud computing as ‘Everything as a Service’
or ‘EaaS.’ Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), which is a more specific concept, offers the
consumer a greater degree of control than other types of cloud services. The authors of
[63] explain that “the consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infras-
tructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and
possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).” Software,
computer storage, and even a desktop are transformed into services offered by providers
such as Google and Amazon. [36] This explanation is adequate for the average consumer,
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but something more specific is needed to obtain a better understanding of these concepts.
Cloud computing, according to [63], is the following:
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential character-
istics, three service models, and four deployment models.
This is a generally accepted definition of cloud computing, as evidenced by its mention
in [68], which also considers it the “closest to capturing in a minimal number of words
all of the essential ideas of cloud computing.” The authors of [104] say that these listed
attributes: ubiquitous, convenient, and on-demand are the driving forces behind the in-
creasing popularity of cloud computing. The mobile cloud is the embodiment of these
elements. According to [94] the mobile cloud is “mobile services and applications deliv-
ered from a centralized (and perhaps virtualized) data center to a mobile device such as a
smart phone.” In [94] they suppose that “the mobile cloud-stands to significantly increase
the overall value of mobility, as well as radically alter the way people live, learn, work, and
play.” With so many mobile users poised to take advantage of all the services the mobile
cloud can offer, the amount of growth is anticipated to be “unprecedented.”
Businesses, particularly “small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs),” can benefit from
what the ‘cloud’ has to offer. [68] As [74] states, “Cloud computing means someone else
runs your computers and software while you use what they deliver and focus on delivering
value.” Value here meaning whatever product or service your customers seek from your
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business. The authors of [74] elaborate: “You can let your people concentrate on doing
their jobs, instead of worrying about which new technology needs to be purchased.”
Cloud computing does more than allow your business to become more focused. The
benefits are monetary, and easily calculable. In the cloud computing world, the business
pays for the outcome, not the technology. [74] The authors of [74] describe it this way:
You no longer need to own some of your computing equipment, which also
means you don’t need staff to maintain it. An external provider can handle
all this for you as a service, just like Starbucks manages the coffee-making
equipment and the barristers. You get a reduced price through economies of
scale.
Normally, a business would need to buy and maintain their own servers and networks.
Cost of these operations include: electricity to run the machines, salaries to those knowl-
edgeable enough to keep them functioning and secure, and replacing technologies as they
rapidly change. When all the equipment is stored in a large warehouse, in a data center
(think Google or Amazon), this reduces all of these costs. Storage as a service (STaaS) is a
fundamental cloud service that takes advantage of these large data centers. The total cost for
a data warehouse to store data is lower than for individual consumers. The authors of [68]
conjecture that “another driver of cloud computing is an evolution from small, distributed,
data-oriented computing centers to more cost-effective, very large scale commercial cloud
services. This trend is likely to continue.” Cost-effectiveness is the key. Electricity, includ-
ing heating and cooling, costs are lower. The cost of backup and general maintenance is
also lower. The authors of [68] go on to say that “The last few years has seen rapid learning
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in warehouse-size data centers on the design of cooling systems, environment monitoring,
and backup with the result that power utility efficiency is improving.”
Another benefit of cloud computing is that businesses do not pay for what they do not
need. The authors of [63] describe this as one of the characteristics of cloud computing,
“rapid elasticity- capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in some cases
automatically, to scale rapidly outward and inward commensurate with demand. To the
consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can
be appropriated in any quantity at any time.” New businesses normally would have to try
to anticipate consumer demand (how quickly and to what extent it will increase) when
purchasing equipment. They don’t want newly purchased servers to become quickly over-
whelmed by a surge in high traffic, leading to down time and consumer dissatisfaction.
“Computing servers and desktop computers in a modern organization are often underuti-
lized, since IT infrastructure is configured to handle theoretical demand peaks.” [104] With
cloud computing, this is not an issue. Most of the time cloud services are pay as you go
(PAYG). When you no longer need a service, you stop paying for it. “The PAYG model’s
flexibility lets customers scale up or scale down the work they do with [providers].” [74]
Both [14] and [68] describe concerns about security and privacy as barriers to busi-
nesses embracing cloud computing. “A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to providing the latest
state-of-the art in security, privacy and trust technologies is neither appropriate nor even
possible,” [68] points out. The authors of [14] observe these and other barriers, including:
“unclear legal jurisdiction and data location issues, complex security and data protection
regulations, uncertain trust in suppliers, and lack of guaranteed data access and portability
between cloud system.” The authors of [39] state the following basic security issue: “For a
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business, disclosing the personal information of customers or employees, or other business
information to a cloud provider is often unrestricted by law because no privacy law or other
law applies.” A related security issue involves encryption of data. Data that is sent over the
Internet is often encrypted for the sake of privacy and security. The authors of [68] explain
this problem:
Encryption is not a complete solution because data needs to be decrypted in
certain situations - so that computation can occur and the usual data manage-
ment functions of indexing and sorting can be carried out. Thus although data
in transit and data at rest are effectively encrypted, the need to decrypt, gener-
ally by the cloud service provider, can be a security concern.
The authors of [39] point out an inherent flaw in cloud services:
A cloud provider will also acquire transactional and relationship information
that may itself be revealing or commercially valuable. For example, the sharing
of information by two companies may signal a merger is under consideration.
In some instances, only the provider’s policy will limit use of that information.
To protect itself, a business should be intimately familiar with the terms of service set out
by the cloud provider, and be aware of potential problems. “Ultimately, however, the uptake
of cloud services is dependent upon providers and their clients trusting each other” [68]
points out. The authors of [14] describes “uncertainties about the way legal and security
issues are managed in the cloud environment are strongly correlated with uncertainties
about the relationship with and the trustworthiness of cloud providers.” The authors of
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[83] observed that “Google’s Terms of Service explicitly disavow any warranty or any
liability for harm that might result from Google’s negligence, recklessness, malintent, or
even purposeful disregard of existing legal obligations to protect the privacy and security of
user data.” If a business gives their data to a cloud service/storage provider, how certain can
they be that the provider will act responsibly, and what would the legal repercussions be if
they are not responsible? These questions cause businesses to hesitate when considering
cloud solutions. The problems of “Data access and portability barriers are less relevant in
the short term, but are expected to become more relevant in time for all stakeholders, as
intensity of cloud usage increases,” [14] states.
The authors of [68] note a security advantage of cloud computing by stating that “Some
threats are better dealt with by warehouse-size data centers (e.g. Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice attacks, which involve attempts to prevent an internet site or service from functioning).
Applications running in the cloud are less vulnerable to these attacks.”
As stated earlier, mobile clouds offer the best that cloud computing has to offer, though
with very particular drawbacks. With a mobile device, such as a Smartphone or IPad (using
3G or 4G networks), one has access to a huge variety of applications and information
that, without the cloud, would be beyond the capabilities of such mobile devices. Smart
phone use is on the rise, with [94] predicting “that up to 60 percent of U.S. mobile phone
subscribers could be smart phone users by the end of 2013.” The rise has been so fast that it
has been difficult to predict. According to [94] “International Data Corporation’s forecast
for smart phone sales in 2010 underestimated the actual growth by half.” These smart phone
users are very interested in the mobile cloud. The authors of [94] explain it this way:
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Smartphone users are most attracted to the mobile cloud because it can sup-
plement and augment their devices by offering better security, convenience,
and an expanded range of functionality compared to device-centric services.
Security is top of mind because users recognize the growing importance of
their mobile devices and understand how difficult life would be if their devices
were lost, stolen, or damaged. Smartphone users also recognize the key value
proposition of the mobile cloud-storing all of their critical information, media
content, and apps in the cloud, where they can be readily accessed no matter
what happens to their mobile device.
Apple advertises on their website that iCloud gives you music, photos, calendars, con-
tacts, and documents, from any device you are currently using and there is no need to
transfer data between your devices as they share the same files. The mobile user has an ac-
count that can be accessed on multiple devices with minimum effort and no repurchasing.
Apps such as SoundHound and Shazam use a cloud database and an algorithm to identify
songs by letting the owner’s mobile device “listen” to the music. Something like this would
not be possible without access to the huge store of data in the cloud and mobility.
Ultraviolet, a feature that is included with most BluRay purchases, allows you to store
your movies in the cloud and access them anywhere, anytime. This concept has appeal
because the idea of ownership is more concrete. You own the movie, and have an actual
disk that proves it. The mobile cloud (Ultraviolet) merely lets you have increased access to
it, and makes your life more convenient.
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Business users are also taking advantage of the mobile cloud, and are far more likely
to do so if they already utilize cloud services on their PCs. [96] Mobile services they
utilize include dropped-call reconnect, visual voicemail, messaging history, mobile con-
ferencing, document management, and “specific business apps that allow them to extend
the boundaries of their offices.” [96] Whether for business or personal use, [95] believes
mobile users are interested in having access to a virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) that
they can personalize, and would have access to from any mobile device. The idea of be-
ing able to utilize a cloud service, but at the same time have something personalized, not
one-size-fits-all, greatly appeals to consumers.
The authors of [94] mention security as being a benefit, but mobile cloud usage involves
a certain amount of risk. The authors of [49] quell the enthusiasm for the mobile cloud
by pointing out that “mobile devices, particularly embedded devices, require proper set
up and protection to be of benefit overall, which include restrictions on the type of data
maintained on the device.” The authors of [24] submit that, with the increased popularity
of smart phone use, “now is a good time to understand the security threat to the mobile
cloud and to begin to prepare for an inevitable increase in security threats.”
One threat is malware, as [24] points out, “smart phones, being sophisticated and fully
featured computers, are receiving the growing attention of malware creators.” The authors
of [15] state that “there are three main [mobile] security threats – malware, privacy and
authenticating access.” He downplays the threat by arguing that, since operating systems
are more diverse on mobile devices, attacks will be less likely than with a PC. “It’s hard to
know where to focus the attack with the mobile cloud,” [15] conjectures. He states directly
afterwards that “There are other attack vectors people could potentially use. For instance,
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one that will work on any mobile device is an SMS message that can get to the device
and persuade it to part with information.” In [17]’s stipulations about cloud computing,
it requires “Data (including sensitive personal information) must be encrypted in transit
and at rest where potentially at risk (e.g., on mobile devices).” Though, as this chapter has
pointed out previously, encryption does not guarantee security.
Other institutions, including governmental, scientific and healthcare, may benefit from
cloud computing technology. The authors of [68] mention “the rapid evolution and widespread
deployment of sensors - in the soil, tree canopies, in gene sequencing machines, in tele-
scopes, on the sea floor.” The point of which would be to “communicate their location,
identity, and local measurements of their environment wirelessly over low-power computer
networks.” This data would be compiled and analyzed in the cloud, where data could be
shared, and conclusions reached, far more quickly than would otherwise be possible. The
authors of [52] grant that “The cloud’s vast computing power is making it easier and less
expensive for companies and clinicians to discover new drugs and medical treatments. An-
alyzing data that used to take years and tens of millions of dollars can now be done for a
fraction of that amount.” “The ability to analyze vast amounts of data in this way is chang-
ing lots of industries - including healthcare.” The authors of [87] discuss both the benefits
and challenges of having all medical records ‘in the cloud.’ While it enables easy com-
munication between all people in the medical profession (doctors, nurses, pharmacists) it
also means risking the privacy of patients. Medical professionals will have to decide if the
convenience is worth the risk.
Another trend in the world of cloud computing is mashups. Mashups integrate existing
web services and content to create a new web tool. The authors of [56] are more specific,
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defining a mashup as “a Web-based application that is created by combining and process-
ing on-line third party resources, that contribute with data, presentation or functionality.”
Facebook and Google maps are examples of popular mashups. Facebook is littered with
mashups, although they call them ‘apps.’ Various games (such as Angry Birds and Words
with Friends), and websites such as Pinterest, hulu and Goodreads are part of the mashups
available on Facebook. You can search for restaurants in a specific area, and Google maps
will show you a map with the exact locations of those restaurants pinpointed. The next
step, requesting directions to these places, is also provided on the same page. These ser-
vices don’t originate from a single place, but are brought together for the convenience of
the user. There are two types of mashups- server side and client side. These two categories
are based on where the data is ‘mashed up.’ Server side mashups occur on the server, and
client side mashups integrate services and content on the client. [71] Usually a combination
of server-side and client-side is used in the creation of a mashup. [56]
Security is a problem for mashups, particularly when it comes data integrity and privacy.
Not much is being written about these problems. The authors of [56] state that “While
security challenges have been identified for mashups only few approaches exist that try to
handle security lacks and identity of mashups.” The provider does not have full control over
the content of the mashup, so [56] determines that “This requires mechanisms to control
the user connection and the data security.” Trust certificates, which would “assure the end-
user the trustworthiness of the content and also the integrity of the mapping application,”
are recommended for use with mashups. These certificates would work in much the same
way as certificates given to online shopping sites. [56] The issue of same-origin policy
11
Figure 1: A diagram of our target universe.
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has been mentioned in certain contexts, such as what [5] provides. First, an explanation of
same-origin policy, given by [5]:
Browsers implement the same-origin policy as a protection mechanism in or-
der to isolate Web applications coming from different domains from each other,
under an assumption that different domains represent different originators. As
a result, if applications in multiple windows or frames are downloaded from
different servers, they will not be able to access each other’s data and scripts.
Same-origin policies make it difficult for mashups to work, so programmers
‘bypass’ the problem. What isn’t discussed, however, is the security vulner-
abilities this opens up. If your bank account, or other similarly private and
sensitive data, is part of the mashup anyone who has access to one part of
the mashup (something less private) could also have access to your sensitive
data. The same-origin policy that normally prevents this has been bypassed,
and therefore rendered useless.
Figure 1 gives an illustration of our target universe, without losing generality. In this
scenario we have multiple users. Some own the data the organization uses and some simply
access this data to perform their tasks. As an example within this target universe, we
have a data owner opening their mashup application (this would normally be performed
automatically by the user’s smartphone). This mashup application requires data that is
both internal to the company and external from outside providers. To offload the mashup
task to the cloud, the request is sent to the user’s mobile cloud-based virtual machine.
This virtual machine is hosted at a provider which hosts many virtual machines for many
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outside users. This same virtual machine, must then request the data the mashup application
requires which is, again, both internal and external to the organization. In this example the
internal data is stored on another cloud providers STorage-as-a-Service (STasS). The virtual
machine must request this data over encrypted channels to build part of the mashup result.
Once received, the mashup also requires data hosted by external providers which do not
encrypt their transmissions to their end users. The virtual machine makes its un-encrypted
request to these providers and receives its unencrypted result. This data is then “mashed
up” and returned to the original mobile user.
There are many ways an attacker could compromise the security of our end user. We have
chosen to focus on the most important ones to this situation, which are outlined in red in
figure 1. We feel these attacks are the most dangerous because they involve the most “legal”
actions or stealthy and attack can conduct, thus minimizing the risk of the attacker being
caught or the attack even being noticed. This creates “unknown unknown” vulnerabilities.
They are unknown, because the entities in the position to detect the attacks do not know
how to detect them. They are “unknown unknowns” because these same entities also do
not know they even need to be on the lookout for such attacks. It is around these attacks
this dissertation is designed.
First, attackers could listen to the traffic from the virtual machine provider to correlate
unencrypted requests from data providers and traffic to end users to determine which unen-
crypted requests match up with encrypted mobile user return traffic. During this completely
passive attack, the attacker needs to only listen to one Internet connection (the virtual ma-
chine provider) to conduct this correlation attack. The results of this attack would enable
the attacker to determine information about many mobile users such as their geographical
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position, the companies they rent cars from, the hotels they plan on staying at and the list
goes on from there.
Second, Attackers must be prevented from tricking the STasS provider the organization’s
internal data is stored from allowing the wrong users from accessing the content. The
struggle is to prevent from taxing the resources of the STasS provider too much, while also
making the encryption key space small enough for data owners and data users to easily
be able to store without becoming too large. This must still be done in a manner that is
versatile enough to allow many different users to have permissions to different sections
of data while not accidently giving any users permissions over data they should not have
access to, which to the STaaS Provider may have looked like a legitimate access request,
thus preventing a breach of confidentiality.
Third, an attacker could legitimately create a virtual machine on the same cloud provider
our organization user’s virtual machine is hosted. If this virtual machine ends up on the
same host, this attacker could perform Operating System or data set fingerprinting through
only memory access requests on the attacker’s virtual machine. Through our presented
“guess and check” strategy, the attacker would be able to confirm “guesses” of memory
content and confirm these “guesses” through memory access delays within their own vir-
tual machine, thus providing a compromise of confidentiality. In the case of Operating
System fingerprinting, this will further provide the opportunity for “one-hit-knock-out” at-
tacks because the attacker would not have to scan the target virtual machine first with net-
work based scanners. Once the attacker has penetrated the virtual machine, further levels
of security such as data integrity can be easily accomplished before an intrusion detection
system has time to respond.
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1.2 Contribution
Figure 2: A model of our target areas.
This dissertation explores several approaches for exploiting public cloud computing in-
frastructures and their possible mitigation strategies. The main contributions of this disser-
tation are the following:
1. Flexible cryptography-based access control of outsourced data.
2. Methods for securing virtual machines from OS and Data Fingerprinting.
3. Secure mobile-to-cloud-to-provider communication.
16
A graphical illustration of the scope of this dissertation is presented in Figure 2. This
dissertation looks at the low level security of cloud computing by exploring OS and data
set fingerprinting in virtual machine hypervisors. Additionally, we look at protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of outsourced data, from the point of view of the
cloud computing clients. Finally, we look at the security of the multiparty communication
required for mobile-to-cloud-to-provider mashup computing.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this dissertation begins with chapter 2, which presents our method to
provide Secure and Efficient Access to Outsourced Data. Chapter 3 presents virtual ma-
chine OS and Data Fingerprinting and our experiments on how to mitigate against attackers
who may use these fingerprinting techniques to gain secret insights into penetrating a cloud
computing virtual machine. Chapter 4 presents our methods of providing secure communi-
cations between both the mobile user to the cloud and the cloud to the information provider
using our newly de-duplication attack defended cloud computing virtual machines. Chapter
5 concludes this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2: SECURE AND EFFICIENT ACCESS TO OUTSOURCED DATA
2.1 Introduction
Since the daily operations of modern corporations heavily depend on their information
processing capabilities, the costs and overhead to manage their computation resources pose
serious challenges to these companies. To free the companies and their manpower from the
burden of IT services, the concept of cloud computing has been proposed. In this new envi-
ronment, a client may choose to outsource its data storage, information processing, or even
the whole information infrastructure to a service provider. These new services allow com-
panies to focus more on their core business and leave the IT operations to professionals.
While the concept of cloud computing provides a new method for information process-
ing, the security problems must be properly solved before these services can be widely
deployed. Since many service providers are untrusted, the confidentiality and privacy of
the clients’ information must be protected by some mechanisms.
Among various services of cloud computing, enabling secure access to outsourced data
lays a solid foundation for information management and other operations. However, more
research efforts are needed to achieve flexible access control to large-scale dynamic data.
For example, using asymmetric encryption to protect data or metadata [40] will impact the
adoption of the outsourcing platform by devices with limited computational power (e.g.
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mobile devices). At the same time, user-group-based data encryption may lead to a com-
plicated access hierarchy after a series of grant and revocation operations. [32]
In this chapter, we focus on the data outsourcing scenario investigated in [26, 27, 31, 32].
In this environment, the data can be updated only by the original owner. At the same time,
end users with different access rights need to read the information in an efficient and secure
way. Both data and user dynamics must be properly handled to preserve the performance
and safety of the outsourced storage system. Before presenting the details of the proposed
approach, we use an example to illustrate the potential applications.
The world’s largest collider accelerator LHC (Large Hadron Collider) can generate about
10 PB (Peta-Bytes, 1015 bytes) data each year. [84] The data can be stored on a third party
cluster and the European Organization for Nuclear Research may publish new data, update
existing records, and delete expired information. The data can be accessed by scientists
in different countries. Since the scientists may have different security clearance levels, en-
cryption based access control will be adopted. At the same time, methods must be designed
to support dynamic changes of the access rights of the end users.
Enforcing data security in this scenario poses new challenges for researchers. First,
since the size of the outsourced data could be huge, we want the server to store only one
copy of each data block (the data should be encrypted). Second, since a popular storage
outsourcing pricing model is pay-per-use (e.g. Amazon S3), we want to reduce the number
of operations on the storage server except for information access and updates. Specifically,
we want to avoid data re-encryption caused by changes of user access rights. Last, but not
least, we want to provide fine-grained access control to end users.
In this chapter, we propose to develop a new approach [105] that integrates several ad-
19
vanced techniques to solve these problems. First, we encrypt every data block with a dif-
ferent symmetric key and adopt the key derivation method [8, 27] to reduce the number
of secrets that the data owner and end users need to maintain. Different from [27], we do
not organize users into groups based on their access rights. Our method, although leading
to more data encryption keys, will simplify operations during user access right changes.
We propose to store the metadata for key derivation with the corresponding data blocks.
In this way, we can establish multiple indexes of the blocks to reduce the communication
overhead for key distribution during data access. Second, we adopt over-encryption by
the server [32] to achieve data isolation among end users even when they have the same
access rights. For the servers that refuse to conduct over-encryption, we propose to use
lazy revocation [50] to prevent revoked users from getting access to updated data. Finally,
we present detailed methods to handle dynamics in both user access rights and outsourced
data. To summarize, the contributions of the research include:
• The proposed approach provides fine grained access control to outsourced data with
flexible and efficient management. The data owner needs to maintain only a few
secrets for key derivation. It does not need to access the storage server except for
data updates.
• We propose comprehensive mechanisms to handle dynamics in user access rights and
updates to outsourced data. The metadata for key derivation will allow us to establish
multiple indexes for different data access patterns of the end users.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
work. In Section 3, we describe assumptions in the investigated scenario. We also discuss
requirements to the proposed approach. Section 4 presents the details of the data access
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procedure. We introduce the construction of the key hierarchies and the key derivation
procedures. The organization of the metadata and data blocks will also be presented. In
Section 5, We describe how to calculate the key set. In Section 6, we describe mechanisms
to handle dynamics in outsourced data blocks and user access rights. Section 7 investigates
the overhead of the proposed approach through simulation. Section 8 studies the safety and
scalability of the proposed approach. Finally, Section 9 discusses future extensions and
concludes this chapter.
2.2 Related Work
Although the official name of ‘cloud computing’ is proposed in recent years, the con-
cept of treating data, storage, software, platform, and even infrastructure as a service has
been investigated for a long time. Cloud computing is poised to provide computation for
public utilities, such as water and electricity, and as such, new challenges arise for the con-
fidentiality, privacy, and integrity of the information and resources in the system. Although
many research papers have been published on related topics, security research for cloud
computing is still in its early stage. Therefore, below we first review the expected proper-
ties of data security in cloud computing and map them to the investigated scenario. We will
then discuss the achievements in two research directions: secure remote untrusted storage
and key management for access hierarchies, from which our proposed approach benefits.
Requirements of Data Security in Cloud Computing
Different from many fields in which a big gap exists between academic research and in-
dustry applications, cloud computing has attracted attentions from both sides since the very
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beginning. For example, secure data storage and management is an important component
of the security guidance recently published by Cloud Security Alliance [23], the member-
ship of which includes the leading corporations in cloud computing such as Sun, eBay,
Visa, and McAfee. In the guidance, a secure data outsourcing service should be evaluated
from at least the following aspects: (1) strong encryption and scalable key management; (2)
user provisioning, de-provisioning, and information lifecycle management; and (3) system
availability and performance.
For the first aspect, in this chapter we propose to use data block level symmetric en-
cryption. Since the proposed mechanism does not depend on any specific encryption algo-
rithms, the end users can make their choices based on the requirements of the applications.
The key derivation tree structure will allow data consumers to use a few keys to generate
all secrets in need. For the second aspect, we provide detailed description on handling
dynamics in user access rights and data blocks. For the last aspect, the performance and
overhead analysis is conducted in Section 7.
Secure Remote Storage
Securing outsourced data for multi-user accesses can be achieved through encrypted file
systems. However, the following analysis will show that existing approaches cannot satisfy
the requirements of the example application discussed in Section 2.1.
To allow users to get secure and efficient access to outsourced data files, both data and
metadata must be properly protected. An early approach [66] presents the basic idea to en-
crypt the information and use hash values and digital signatures to guarantee information
integrity. FARSITE [1] uses symmetric secrets to encrypt files and uses every reader’s pub-
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lic key to encrypt the symmetric keys. In Plutus [50], both files and directory information
are encrypted. It uses sign and verify keys respectively to determine whether or not a user
can write or read a file. Since the key generation procedure depends on power-modular
computation, the overhead is relatively heavy. SiRiUS [40] adopts a more complicated
structure. Every data file has an encryption key and a sign key. At the same time, ev-
ery user has a public/private key pair. The approach continuously signs the metadata tree to
guarantee the freshness of the information and prevent rollback attacks. Every time a secret
is revoked, it will generate a new key and reencrypt corresponding data files. In SUNDR
[57] the authors use hash trees and chains to prevent fork attacks and guarantee that users
have the same view of files. They use update certificates to handle concurrent updates. The
advantages and disadvantages of many approaches can be found in [53]. Recently, a data
sharing platform for outsourced information using asymmetric encryption is proposed in
[88]. We find that all these approaches adopt asymmetric encryption to protect data confi-
dentiality. At the same time, encrypting information at the data block level will make the
key management mechanism of secure file systems very cumbersome. Therefore, a new
approach is needed to protect the safety of the outsourced data.
Key Management for Access Hierarchies
To enable secure and efficient access to outsourced data, investigators have tried to in-
tegrate key derivation mechanisms [19, 20, 59, 114] with encryption-based data access
control. Atallah et al. [8] propose a generic method that uses only hash functions to derive
a descendant’s key in a hierarchy. The method can handle updates locally and avoid propa-
gation. Although the proposed key derivation tree structure can be viewed as a special case
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of access hierarchies, analysis in Section 8 will show that our method serves the studied
application better.
In [27], the authors divide users into groups based on their access rights to the data.
The users are then organized into a hierarchy and further transformed to a tree structure
to reduce the number of encryption keys. This method also helps to reduce the number of
keys that are given to each user during the initiation procedure. In [32], data records are
organized into groups based on the users that can access them. Since the data in the same
group are encrypted by the same key, changes to user access rights will lead to updates in
data organization. While a creative idea in this approach is to allow servers to conduct a
second level encryption (over-encryption) to control access, repeated access revocation and
grant may lead to a very complicated hierarchy structure for key management. In [31], the
approach will store multiple copies of the same data record encrypted by different keys. At
the same time, when access rights change, reencryption and data updates to the server must
be conducted. These operations will cause extra overhead on the server and do not fit into
our application scenarios. An experimental evaluation of these approaches can be found in
[26].
2.3 Problem Definition
In this section, we briefly sketch out the application scenario under investigation and the
system assumptions. We also describe the requirements to the proposed data outsourcing
mechanism.
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Application Scenario and Assumptions
As the example in Section 1 illustrates, the owner-write-users-read scenario is a popular
case in the storage outsourcing applications. Figure 3 provides an abstract illustration of
the scenario under investigation. The data owner stores a large amount of information on
the service provider. Since the service provider is untrusted, the owner will encrypt the
outsourced data before putting them on the server. Here we assume that the smallest infor-
mation access unit is called a ‘block’. This is an abstract concept and it may have different
meanings in different systems. To provide fine-grained access control, the encryption will
be conducted at the block level. Only the owner can make updates to the outsourced data.
Here the operations include updates to data blocks, and deletion, insertion, and appending
of blocks. We also assume that there exist pre-distributed secrets between data owner and
service provider, and between data owner and end-users. The key distribution and update
problem is beyond the scope of this research and we refer interested readers to existing
approaches such as [13].
Figure 3: Illustration of the application scenario.
The outsourced data can be accessed by many different end users that are distributed all
over the network. Since the end users may use devices with weak processing capabilities
such as PDAs, we want to avoid computationally expensive operations such as asymmetric
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encryption of data blocks. At the same time, we want to reduce the amount of information
that is stored on the end users. The access rights of the end users are different and they may
change (grant and revocation) as time proceeds. Therefore, right keys must be provided to
the end users to control their access.
We assume that the service provider adopts a curious but not malicious model. That
means, the provider will not intentionally send wrong data blocks to an end user but it
will try to get access to the plaintext of the stored information. To preserve confidentiality
of the outsourced data, the owner may ask the service provider to conduct a second level
encryption (over-encryption) [32] before the data is sent to the end users. For providers that
refuse to offer this service, we adopt the lazy revocation method [50] to reduce information
leakage through eavesdropping.
With the introduction of the roles of data owner, service provider and end user, we can
describe the data access procedure as follows. An end user will send a data access request
to the owner. The owner will refer to its access control matrix and send back corresponding
encryption keys through the secure channel between them. At the same time, the owner will
send back a data access certificate to the end user. The user will then present the certificate
to the service provider. The provider will verify it and send the corresponding encrypted
data blocks to the end user. We assume that the end user has information to verify the
integrity of the received data. [41, 107] In this way, end users directly communicate with
the service provider to get the data blocks and the owner will not become the data transfer
bottleneck.
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System Requirements
In this section, we describe the requirements on efficiency and security to the proposed
approach. First, since the outsourced data could be huge and the service provider may
charge the owner based on used space, we want to maintain only one encrypted copy for
each data block on the outsourced storage. This will put new challenges to the key manage-
ment mechanism. Second, in addition to providing the storage space, the service provider
may or may not offer the service of over-encryption [32] when it sends the data blocks
to end users. The proposed mechanism must properly handle both cases to preserve data
confidentiality. Third, since the service provider may have a pay-per-use pricing policy, the
data owner should reduce the number of information accesses to the service provider when
they are not caused by updates to data blocks. That means we want to avoid data block
reencryption when the access rights of end users change. Last but not least, we want to
reduce the storage, communication, and computation overhead on the data owner and end
users to promote the wide adoption of the proposed approach. Later discussion will show
that some of the requirements conflict with each other and the designed approach will try
to achieve a tradeoff.
2.4 Secure and Efficient Data Access
In this section, we present the details of the proposed approach. We first introduce key-
derivation-based data block encryption. We will then describe the data access procedure.
Mechanisms to reduce the overhead on the data owner and to prevent information access
from revoked users will also be discussed.
27
Determining Keys for Data Encryption
As we introduce in Section 3, the smallest information access units are data blocks.
Therefore, to provide fine-grained access control, we propose to encrypt every data block
with a different secret. Here we do not assume the adoption of any specific symmetric
encryption algorithm and leave the choice to the system designers. However, an efficient
mechanism must be designed to allow data owner and end users to manage the encryption
keys. We assume that the outsourced data contains n blocks {D1,D2, · · · ,Dn} and each
block is encrypted with a randomly generated secret ki (i=1 to n). If the data owner keeps a
copy of all these keys, the storage overhead will be linear to n. At the same time, when an
end user needs to access l data blocks, the communication overhead between the owner and
the user for key distribution will also be linear to l. This overhead can be overwhelming
for many end users when we consider that the outsourced data can easily contain millions
of blocks. Therefore, a more efficient key management method must be designed.
To solve this problem, we propose to adopt the key derivation method. [8] The basic
idea is as follows. Each of the encryption keys ki can be represented as the XOR result of
a public part and a private part. The public part will be stored as metadata with the corre-
sponding block. The private part, on the contrary, will be generated through key derivation
hierarchies. Here every key in the hierarchies can be derived from its ancestors. Two hierar-
chies are used in our example to enable more versatile key assignment for different sections
of data blocks they are mapped to. Since the derivation procedure uses a one-way func-
tion, we cannot reverse the computation to get the secret keys of the ancestors and sibling
nodes. In this way, the data owner needs to maintain only the root nodes of the hierarchies.
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During the key distribution procedure, the owner can send the secrets in the hierarchies
to end users based on their access rights. The end user will derive the leaf nodes in the
hierarchy/hierarchies. It will then combine the derivation results with the public metadata
to decrypt the data blocks. The cost of this approach includes the calculation of one-way
functions and XOR operations during key derivation. Since previous experiments [100]
show that both operations can be accomplished very efficiently, in this paper we propose to
trade computation for storage and communication overhead.
While there are different choices of the organization of key hierarchies and key derivation
functions, below we present an approach using the binary tree structure and hash functions.
Both hierarchies are computed in the same way, but with different root nodes, so we will
describe a one hierarchy derivation. Without losing generality, we assume that the out-
sourced data contains n blocks and 2p−1 ≤ n < 2p. Therefore, we can build a binary tree
with height p as follows. The data owner will choose a root secret (root node) s0,1. Here the
first index of the key represents its level in the hierarchy, and the second index represents
its sequence number in the level. For example, for level x in the hierarchy, the sequence
numbers are from 1 to 2x. In this way, for node si, j in the hierarchy, its parent is s(i−1),(⌈ j/2⌉)
(when i ̸= 0), and its children are s(i+1),(2∗ j−1) and s(i+1),(2∗ j) (when si, j is not a leaf node).
The nodes in level p will be used as the private parts to calculate the encryption keys ki.
The public parts yi will be stored with the blocks Di as metadata. An example hierarchy is
illustrated in Figure 4.
Now let us look at the key derivation procedure. The data owner chooses a public
hash function h(). For any node si, j in the hierarchy, its left child can be calculated as
s(i+1),(2∗ j−1) = h(si, j||(2 ∗ j − 1)||si, j). Here we ‘sandwich’ the sequence number of the
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child node with the parent’s key and then apply the hash function. We can calculate the
right child of si, j in a similar way. Through repeatedly applying this function, a node can
calculate the secrets of all of its descendants. When we reach level p of the hierarchy, the
hash results can be XORed with the metadata to get the encryption keys. Since XOR is a
bit by bit manipulation, the public part (yn and zn in figure 4) that is XORed can be chosen
to give the same keys when secrets from different trees point to the same data blocks.
Figure 4: Key derivation hierarchies.
The safety of the approach comes from the one-way property of the hash function. While
a node can easily derive its descendants in the hierarchy by applying the public hash func-
tion, it has to reverse the function to get the secrets of its siblings or ancestors. If a secure
hash function is chosen, the end users cannot decrypt the data blocks that they are not
authorized to access.
We need to pay attention to several issues when we establish the key hierarchies and
distribute the secrets during information access. First, when we choose the height of the
hierarchies, we need to leave some room for the insertion and appending operations to
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the outsourced data. The details of such operations will be discussed in the next section.
Second, we should not disclose encryption keys of the blocks that are temporarily missing
from the outsourced data. For example, when n = 7 and an end user can access blocks D5,
D6 and D7, the owner should send s2,3 and s3,7 to the user instead of s1,2. In this way, later
when we append D8 to the outsourced data and the user cannot access it, we do not need to
revoke the secret.
We notice that end users’ access rights have a direct impact on the communication over-
head of the proposed approach. For example, if one secret in the hierarchy can be used to
derive all encryption keys of the data blocks that a user needs to access but not any other
keys, the owner needs to send only this secret to the end user. On the contrary, if we have
only one key derivation hierarchy and the data blocks that a user wants to access do not
share any common ancestors in level (p−1) of the hierarchy, the number of returned keys
will be equal to the number of requested blocks.
Two methods can be used to solve this problem and improve the efficiency of the owner.
First, we can use the method described in [27]. The basic idea is to organize data blocks
with similar access patterns into groups and give them sequential index numbers when they
are outsourced. In this way, the end users have a higher probability to access data blocks
with consecutive index numbers and the owner can locate a few keys in the hierarchy to
satisfy a reading request. The disadvantage, however, is that the block organization can be
mapped to only one access pattern.
Second, we can generate multiple key derivation hierarchies, each of which will have a
different mapping function between the leaf nodes and the index numbers of the outsourced
blocks. Here the metadata for the leaf nodes of each hierarchy must be stored with the data
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blocks. An example of two hierarchies is illustrated in Figure 4. In the first hierarchy, the
sequence numbers of the leaf nodes and the index numbers of the data blocks are identical.
In the second hierarchy, the left half of the tree maps to all blocks with odd index numbers,
and the right half maps to blocks with even index numbers. During an information access
procedure, the owner can examine both hierarchies to locate the smallest key set for secret
derivation. The cost of maintaining multiple hierarchies includes the storage overhead of
the metadata and hash calculation during secret derivation. A quantitative analysis will be
presented in Section 7.
Data Access Procedure
In this part we describe the data access procedure. To prevent revoked users from get-
ting access to outsourced data through eavesdropping, we assume that the service provider
will conduct over-encryption [32] when it sends data blocks to end users. To conduct this
operation, the service provider and end users need to share a pseudo random bit sequence
generator P(). [21, 58] Given a seed, P() can generate a long sequence of pseudo random
bits. The scenarios in which the service provider refuses to offer this operation will be
discussed in the next section.
We use O to represent the data owner, S to represent the service provider, and U to
represent the end user. We assume that O shares the pairwise keys kOU and kOS with U
and S respectively. With these assumptions, the data access procedure works as follows.
1. U will send a data access request to O .
U → O : {U ,O,EkOU (U ,O,request index,data block indexes,MAC code)}
Since only U and O know kOU , O will be able to authenticate the sender. The request
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index will be increased by 1 every time U sends out a request and it is used by O to defend
against replay attacks. The request contains the index numbers of the data blocks that U
wants to access. The Message Authentication Code (MAC) will protect the integrity of the
packet.
2. When O receives this message, it will authenticate the sender and verify the integrity
and freshness of the request. It will then examine its access control matrix and make sure
that U is authorized to read all blocks in the request. If the request passes this check, the
owner will determine the set of keys S ′ in the hierarchies such that (1) S ′ can derive
the keys that are used to encrypt the requested data blocks; and (2) U is authorized to
know all keys that can be derived from S ′. The algorithm to determine S ′ from multiple
hierarchies will be presented in Section 4.
The owner will then generate the reply to the end user.
O → U : {O,U ,EkOU (O,U ,request index,ACM index,
seed f or P(),S ′,cert f or S ,MAC code)}
Here the request index is used to uniquely label this reply. The ACM index is used by
O to label the freshness of the Access Control Matrix (ACM). This index will be increased
by 1 every time O changes some end user’s access rights. The updated ACM index will be
sent to S by O to prevent those revoked users from re-using expired certificates to access
data blocks. The seed is a random number to initiate P() so that U can decrypt the over-
encryption conducted by S . U will use S ′ to derive the data block encryption keys. The
cert in the packet is a certificate for the service provider and it has the following format:
{EkOS(U ,request index,ACM index,seed, indexes o f data blocks,MAC code)}
33
3. The user U will send {U ,S ,request index,cert} to the service provider. When S
receives this packet, it can verify that the cert is generated by O since only they know the
secret kOS. S will make sure that the user name and request index in cert match to the
values in the packet. If the ACM index in cert is smaller than the value that S receives
from O , some changes to the access control matrix have happened and S will notify U
to get a new cert. Otherwise, the service provider will retrieve the encrypted data blocks
and conduct the over-encryption as follows. Using the seed as the initial state of P(), the
function will generate a long sequence of pseudo random bits. S will use this bit sequence
as a one-time pad and conduct the XOR operation to the encrypted blocks. The computation
results will then be sent to U .
4. When U receives the data blocks, it will use the seed to re-generate the pseudo
random bit sequence and use S ′ to derive the encryption keys. It will then recover the data
blocks.
This approach adopts two methods to reduce the overhead on the data owner. First, the
cert that it provides to the end user does not contain a timestamp. Therefore, if the access
control matrix has not been changed and the ACM index value has not been updated, a user
can reuse previous certs to access the data blocks. Second, during the whole data access
procedure, the owner only needs to use the root key(s) to determine S ′ by calculating a
group of hash functions. Since this computation can be accomplished very efficiently, the
data owner will not become the bottleneck in the application.
This approach adopts two methods to prevent revoked users from getting access to the
outsourced data. First, when an end user U loses access to some data blocks, the access
control matrix at O will be updated. This will lead to the increase of the ACM index and
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the value will be sent to S . In this way, if U presents the old cert to S , it will be rejected.
U can still get access to the data blocks by eavesdropping on the traffic between S and
other end users if it has kept a copy of the key set S ′. To defend against such attacks,
we ask the service provider to conduct over-encryption before sending out the data blocks.
Since for every data request the seed is dynamically generated and never transmitted in
plaintext, U will not be able to regenerate the bit sequences of other end users. Therefore,
unless U keeps a copy of the data blocks from previous access, it will not be able to get
the information.
2.5 Calculating the Key Set S ′
Given a key derivation hierarchy, it is fairly easy to locate the smallest set of nodes that
can be used to calculate the encryption keys of the blocks in a data reading request. When
multiple key derivation hierarchies exist in the system, it is possible to combine the node
sets from different hierarchies and find an even smaller node set to calculate the keys. This
procedure, however, can be very computationally expensive. Below we discuss the two
problems respectively.
Since the encryption key of a data block will be mapped to only one leaf node in a
hierarchy, “Determine the node set in one hierarchy” is a greedy algorithm which can be
used to determine the smallest node set in it for a reading request.
When multiple hierarchies have been established for the data blocks, we can calculate
a node set N for each of the hierarchies. The procedure to select a minimum number of
nodes from these sets to cover the blocks in the request is actually a variation of the set
covering problem, which is one of the famous NP-complete problems in Karp’s list. [51]
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Many heuristic approaches have been proposed for this problem [97] and the data owner
can balance between the search and communication overhead.
Determine the node set in one hierarchy
N = /0; D = indexes o f data blocks in the request;
While (D ̸= /0)
{
choose any d ∈ D;
locate the lea f node n in the hierarchy f or d;
While (the user is authorized to read all keys
derived f rom n′s parent)
{n = n.parent;}
remove the indexes f rom D whose keys can be derived f rom n;
add n into N;
}
return N;
2.6 Handling Dynamics in System
Thus far, we have considered only static data and access rights of end users. Although
some applications, such as digital libraries, have relatively stable data contents, many sce-
narios for outsourced data storage require the system to support data dynamics. For exam-
ple, in the DoE case discussed in Section 1, scientists may conduct new experiments and
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need to add new information to the outsourced data. At the same time, they may find that
some data have been mis-calculated and several data blocks on S need to be updated.
The proposed approach also needs to support changes to access rights of end users. For
example, when DoE is collaborating with researchers in country X , it will temporarily au-
thorize them to read more data. When the collaboration is terminated, the access rights
will be revoked. Below we show how to amend the basic scheme to handle dynamic oper-
ations in the proposed system. The revised approach still tries to satisfy the requirements
described in Section 3.2.
Dynamics in User Access Rights
Dynamics in user access rights can be represented as different combinations of two prim-
itive operations: access right grant and revocation.
Grant Access Right
When an end user U is authorized to read a data block Di, the owner will change its
access control matrix and increase the value of ACM index. The next time that U submits
a data access request, the owner will recalculate the key set K ′ based on the new access
rights. The service provider and the end user do not need to change to adapt to this update.
Revoke Access Right
Access right revocation is a more complicated event and we need to discuss two mech-
anisms based on whether or not the service provider conducts over-encryption during data
block transmission.
As we describe in Section 4.2, over-encryption conducted by the service provider can
defend against eavesdroppers even when they have the data block encryption keys. Under
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this condition the owner will update the access control matrix and increase the ACM index
by 1. It will repeatedly send the new ACM index to the service provider until it receives a
confirmation. At this time the revoked user can no longer use its old cert. The owner will
calculate a new key set K ′ when it receives the next data access request from the revoked
user.
If the service provider does not conduct over-encryption, the eavesdropper will be able
to get access to data blocks if it has kept a copy of the encryption keys. Since the system
design criteria require the owner to reduce the number of accesses to outsourced storage,
we propose to adopt the lazy revocation method. [50] In lazy revocation, we assume that it
is acceptable for the revoked user to read unmodified data blocks. However, it must not be
able to read updated blocks. Lazy revocation trades re-encryption and data access overhead
for a degree of security. The details of the method are as follows.
When the access right to data block Di of the user U is revoked, the access control
matrix in O will be updated and the ACM index increased. At the same time, O will
label this data block to show that some user’s access right has been revoked since its last
content update. Before Di is updated for the next time, the owner will not re-encrypt the
block on the outsourced storage. Since the ACM index value has been changed, U can no
longer use its old cert to access Di. However, when another user gets encrypted Di through
the network, U can eavesdrop on the traffic. Since the service provider does not conduct
over-encryption, the data will be transmitted in the same format whoever the reader is.
Therefore, should U have kept a copy of the encryption key, it will get access to Di. This
result, however, is the same as U has kept a copy of Di before its access right is revoked.
When the owner needs to change the data block from Di to D′i, it will check the label
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and find that some user’s access right has been revoked. Therefore, it cannot encrypt the
updated data block with the current key. To solve this problem, the owner will encrypt a
control block with the secret ki and put it at the slot for Di. Since the encryption key does
not change, the metadata in the key derivation hierarchies will not be impacted. The control
block will contain a pointer to another block in which the updated data is stored. It will
also contain enough information for the owner to derive the new encryption key. In this
way, when a user retrieves this control block from the service provider, it will submit it to
the owner. The owner will derive the new key and send it back to the user. At the same
time, a new cert will be generated so that the user can get the new block from the service
provider. A revoked user will be able to read the control block. However, the owner will
not send the new encryption key and the cert to it. Therefore, the revoked user cannot get
access to the updated data. More details of this method will be introduced when we discuss
dynamics in the outsourced data.
The adoption of lazy revocation also explains the reason that we want to encrypt every
data block with a different key. If we divide data blocks into groups based on the users that
can access them, we can encrypt the blocks in the same group with a single key. In this case,
whenever a user’s access right is revoked, the data block group needs to be fragmented and
many blocks need to be re-encrypted. Larger overhead will be caused on the data owner
and service provider. At the same time, the requirement to reduce accesses to outsourced
storage by the data owner will also be violated.
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Dynamics in Outsourced Data
The data owner may need to conduct various operations on data blocks (e.g. update,
delete, insert, append). Below we describe the details.
Block Deletion
When a data block Di is deleted from the outsourced data, the owner will use a special
control block to replace Di. The special block will be encrypted by ki and stored at the
original slot for Di on the service provider. The metadata for different hierarchies will not
be impacted. At the same time, the owner will label its access control matrix to show that
the block no longer exists. The end users can still access this control block but they will
not get any useful information from the contents.
Block Update
We assume that the owner needs to modify the i-th block of the outsourced data from Di
to D′i. Since in Section 6.1 we require the owner to maintain a label to show whether or
not some user’s access right to this block has been revoked since its last update, below we
describe two methods based on the value of the label.
If no user’s access right to this data block has been revoked since its last update, the
owner can update its content in the current storage place. The owner will first locate the
slot in which Di is stored and derive its encryption key. It will then use the key to encrypt
D′i and write the new block to the storage place. The end users will not be impacted by this
operation and they will automatically get the new data when they access the block.
If some user’s access right to Di has been revoked since its last update and the service
provider does not conduct over-encryption during data transmission, we cannot encrypt the
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new block D′i with the current key. On the contrary, we will encrypt a control block with
ki and write it to the i-th block of the outsourced data. The control block will contain the
following information: (1) a pointer to the data block in which D′i is stored; (2) information
used by the data owner to derive the new encryption key of D′i; (3) information used by the
data owner to verify the integrity of the control block. The owner will also use the new
secret to encrypt D′i and write it to the corresponding place in S.
When a user needs to access D′i, it will get the encrypted control block from the service
provider and submit it to the owner. The owner will verify the authenticity and integrity of
the control block and derive the current encryption key. It will then return the key with a
cert to the user through a secure channel so that the user can access D′i from S . A revoked
user can get the control block but it will not get the new encryption key and the cert from
the owner.
While there are different ways to implement the block update operation, below we de-
scribe one approach. We assume that the data owner will choose two secret keys k′0 and
kveri f y. The former is used to protect the newly generated encryption keys for the updated
data blocks, and the latter is used to verify the integrity of the control blocks. When the
owner needs to update Di, it will use ki to encrypt the control block and store it in the i-th
block of the outsourced data. The control block has the format of:
Eki(Ek′0(k
′
i,2
p + i,x),hashkveri f y(k
′
i,2
p + i,x))
In the first component, the owner will use k′0 to encrypt the newly generated secret k
′
i, the
index number 2p+ i of the block, and the number of times x that Di has been updated. In the
second component, kveri f y will be used to generate the message authentication code of the
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information to protect its integrity. The owner will encrypt D′i with k
′
i and store the result
in the block with the index number (2p + i). Figure 5 illustrates the update operations.
When a user U needs to access the updated data block D′i, it will first get the encrypted
control block from S and submit it to the data owner. The owner will use ki and k′0 to
determine the secret k′i. It will use the secret kveri f y to examine the integrity of the control
block. The owner will return the encryption key and a new cert to U so that U can get D′i
from the service provider.
This method has several properties. First, we store all metadata in the control blocks on
the service provider so that the data owner only needs to store two secrets k′0 and kveri f y.
Second, since kveri f y is known to only the owner, attackers cannot generate fake control
blocks. Third, every time the data block Di is updated, the value of x will be increased and
the encryption key will be regenerated. At the same time, the control blocks of different
data blocks will not be confused since their index numbers have a one-to-one mapping.
Figure 5: Handling updates to data blocks.
The costs of this method include another group of encryption/decryption operations and
a second round of communication between the owner and the user. Although the blocks for
the updated data have the index numbers from (2p +1) to (2p +n), we have to clarify that
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we do not need to double the storage space on the service provider when only a fraction of
blocks are updated. Instead, we can maintain a list of the updated blocks and their index
numbers.
Block Insertion and Appending
The data owner may need to generate new information and put it on the service provider.
Here we do not intentionally distinguish insertion from appending and follow the same
procedure to handle the two operations. The data owner will locate an unused block index,
generate the encryption key and derive the metadata, encrypt the data block, and store it
on the service provider. One trick that can be adopted to improve the efficiency of future
data access is to reserve some index numbers in the storage space. Later the data owner
can insert the new data blocks into these holes based on their access patterns.
2.7 Analysis of Overhead: an Example
In this part, we use the application scenario described in Section 1 as an example to an-
alyze the computational, storage, and communication overhead of a data access operation.
We assume that the size of the outsourced data is 10 PB and the data block size is 4 KB.
Therefore, we have 2.5× 1012 blocks. It is prohibitively expensive to store all encryption
keys on the data owner. Using the method described in Section 4, we find that the height
of the key hierarchy is p = 42. We assume the data that a user needs to access each time
falls into a 4GB = 1,000,000 data block range. The access requests may read different
fractions of the data. Since the authors of [28, 79] find that scientific databases have very
infrequent data update operations, we assume that 0.1% of data blocks have been updated
and they have control blocks on the server. Previous research [6, 65] shows that the number
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of consecutive data blocks that are accessed in scientific applications ranges from 100 to
30,000. Therefore, in our analysis we assume that on average 95% of the data is accessed
in chunks of 1,000 consecutive data blocks. The remaining 5% of the accessed blocks
distribute randomly and uniformly in the 4 GB data. We assume that two key derivation
hierarchies as shown in Figure 4 have been established. We adopt 256-bit block encryption
keys and 64-bit block indexes in our system. We also assume that the owner, the end users,
and the server all use computers with 1-GHz CPU. Combining the information, we show
the communication overhead of each party in Table 1.
Table 1: Overhead of the proposed approach.
computational overhead (in machine cycle)
owner O server S user U
key derivation 27M – 720M
one-time pad
generation and – 10G 10G
over-encryption
communication overhead
owner O server S user U
data blk index # 6KByte – 10KByte
control blk – – 10.5KByte
keys per hierarchy 16KByte – –
updated data blk – 1MByte –
The table shows only the overhead of the proposed key management mechanism. It does not contain the transmission and decryption of
the 1GB outsourced data since that overhead is independent of the adopted key management scheme.
Based on these assumptions, we can calculate the overhead of the data access opera-
tions. The computational overhead of the proposed approach comes from two aspects: key
derivation using hash functions and over-encryption using a one-time key pad. When the
data owner O receives the index numbers of the data blocks that U wants to access, it
needs to derive the encryption keys from the roots of the hierarchies. It can then compare
the two key sets and adopt the one with a smaller size. Since the hash function needs about
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20 machine cycles to process one byte [75], we need 1440 machine cycles to accomplish
key derivation in one level. For the generation of and encryption with the one-time key
pad, previous research shows that algorithms such as ISAAC [82] need 19 machine cycles
to generate 32 bits of pseudo random number. At the same time, exclusive-or operation is
usually more efficient than random number generation.
Figure 6 illustrates the simulation results of the expected computation time at the owner,
the user, and the service provider when 10% to 70% of the data blocks in 4 GB are accessed.
We can see that the owner and the end user need only a few seconds of computation time
to derive the block encryption keys even when 2.8 GB data is read. At the same time,
the service provider and the user need less than 30 seconds of computation time for the
XOR-based double encryption. All of the computation time can be easily hidden in the
transmission time of the data.
Figure 6: Computation time caused by the proposed approach.
For the communication overhead we focus on the number of key derivation keys that
the owner needs to transmit to the end user, especially the reduction caused by the estab-
lishment of multiple hierarchies. We experiment with two scenarios of the 5% data blocks
whose index numbers are not consecutive. In the first scenario, the blocks are chosen
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randomly and uniformly from the 4 GB data. In the second scenario, they are still cho-
sen randomly but are restricted to the odd index numbers. In this way, they have a better
chance to be the descendants of the same secret in the second key derivation hierarchy.
We use this simple, yet biased access pattern, to demonstrate the potential advantages of
multiple hierarchies. The simulation results are shown in Figure 7.
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Communication overhead of the proposed approach.
In Figure 7.(a), we illustrate the number of keys that the owner needs to send out for
different access requests. We find that when the user reads 2.8 GB data, the communication
overhead for key distribution is about 40000 keys × 32 Bytes/key ≈ 1.3 MB. As a compar-
ison, if every block encryption key is transmitted, the overhead will be 22.4 MB. Although
the second hierarchy does not bring a lot of benefits to the random access scenario, the
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reduction in the odd-index only scenario becomes very obvious. Figure 7.(b) provides a
better illustration of the results. For the odd-index only scenario, the second key derivation
hierarchy saves 12% keys when 2.8 GB data is read. Please note that our simulation adopts
a very simple access pattern for the key hierarchy establishment. When the data owner has
a more accurate access pattern model, a larger reduction could be expected. At the same
time, we can use the heuristic solutions to the set covering problem [16] to select keys from
both hierarchies to further reduce the communication overhead.
The proposed approach introduces very limited storage overhead. The key derivation
mechanism allows the owner O to store only the root keys of the hierarchies. The end
user U does not need to pre-calculate and store all data block encryption keys. Quite the
opposite, it can calculate the keys on the fly when it is conducting the data block decryption
operations. The service provider S needs to store an extra copy of the updated data blocks.
When the data update rate is very low in the applications, the extra storage overhead at S
is also low compared to the size of the outsourced data.
One problem that we need to consider is the lengthened data retrieval delay caused by
the access to the updated data blocks. We can shorten the response time from both the
server and the data owner sides. At the server side, it has a one-to-one mapping among
the index numbers of the original data blocks and those of the updated blocks. When the
server receives a data access request to a control block, it can send the updated data block
together with the control block to the user. This will not compromise the confidentiality
of the information since the user still needs to get the new encryption key from the owner.
At the data owner side, it can take advantage of the temporal locality of data access to
shorten the response time. The owner can maintain a cache of the mapping between the
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index numbers of updated data blocks and their new encryption keys. In this way, when
the owner receives an access request to such a block, it can directly send both the old and
the new encryption keys back without waiting for the control block. This operation allows
the server and the owner to deliver information of the updated blocks to end users more
efficiently by avoiding another round of request/reply.
2.8 Discussion
In this section we discuss several problems of the proposed key management approach.
Comparison to CCS’05 Approach
Consider the difference between our approach and the mechanism proposed by Atallah
et al. in ACM CCS’05. [8] First, we want to say that Atallah’s paper provides a more
generic approach to key management in access hierarchies. It has several features that our
approach does not provide such as the support of downward and limited depth inheritance
and the support of shortcut edges in hierarchies.
However, when we zoom into the application scenarios investigated in this paper, our
approach makes special adjustments to adapt to their properties. For example, our approach
handles user revocation differently from [8]. When a user’s access right changes (but the
data blocks do not change), we want to avoid operations to the storage service provider. We
adopt two methods: over-encryption and lazy revocation, to achieve this goal. In [8], the
authors suggest two schemes, both of which will immediately change the encryption keys
and metadata of the impacted data blocks. These methods will cause extra communication
and computational overhead for data reencryption to achieve consistent data confidentiality.
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Security of the Approach
In previous sections we have described mechanisms to defend against eavesdroppers.
Now, we investigate the safety of the proposed approach over collusive attacks and replay
attacks of the control blocks.
In collusive attacks, two or more revoked end users may put their stored keys together
and try to derive a secret that is not the descendant of any key known to them. Following
the proof in [8], we can show that the adversaries have to have a non-negligible advantage
in breaking the hash function to accomplish this task. Therefore, the proposed approach is
robust against collusive attacks if the hash function is considered safe.
In Section 6.2, we show that an end user needs to send the control block of the updated
data to the owner to get the new encryption key. Here a user may send an old control
block to the owner to get the encryption key of a previous version of the data block. In
this way, an adversary that can access only the current data block will get a copy of the old
encryption key. Should it have kept a copy of the encrypted data block by eavesdropping
on the network traffic, it will compromise the backward secrecy of the system. To defend
against the replay attack, the data owner must verify the freshness of the control block. For
example, when the service provider sends the control block to the end user, it can encrypt
the user name, the request index, and the hash of the control block with the secret key
between O and S . In this way, the owner will be able to verify whether or not this control
block is the latest version.
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Extending to Multi-owner Outsourced Data
While in this chapter we consider only the simple case of storage outsourcing with a
single data owner, the proposed approach can be extended to the scenarios in which the
data has multiple owners and each of them can change data blocks independently. In this
part, we discuss techniques to accomplish this extension.
To preserve data consistency, we should have orderly execution of the update operations
when multiple owners want to change the data contents. This can be achieved through a
semaphore flag at the service provider S . This problem has been extensively studied in
Operating Systems and distributed systems for access to shared resources.
The update operations to the multi-owner data are similar to the procedures described in
Section 6. When a data owner wants to update a data block, it will store a control block
to its original place. The control block will be protected by a secret key shared among the
data owners. The control block contains a pointer to the new storage place, the information
used by the owners to derive the new data encryption key, and a hash value of the whole
block to protect its integrity. To prevent an attacker from sending an old control block or
a control block for another data block to the owner, the service provider will link a control
block to a specific data access request when the contents are sent back to the end user.
2.9 Conclusions
We propose a mechanism to achieve secure and efficient access to outsourced data in
owner-write-users-read applications. We assume that the outsourced data has a very large
size and we try to reduce the overhead at the data owner and service provider. We pro-
pose to encrypt every data block with a different key so that flexible cryptography-based
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access control can be achieved. Through the adoption of the key derivation method, the
owner needs to maintain only a few secrets. We propose to store the metadata with the
blocks so that multiple key derivation hierarchies can be established for different access
patterns to reduce the processing overhead of the data access requests. Analysis shows that
the key derivation procedure based on hash functions will introduce very limited overhead.
We propose to use over-encryption and/or lazy revocation to prevent revoked users from
getting access to updated data blocks. We design mechanisms to handle both updates to
outsourced data and changes in user access rights. We investigate the computational, stor-
age, and communication overhead of the approach through simulation. We also investigate
the scalability and safety of the approach.
Extensions to our approach include the following aspects. First, we plan to design a new
scheme for key management based on this approach so that it can be applied to many-write-
many-read applications. Second, we want to design dynamic mapping functions among
keys in the hierarchy and index numbers of data blocks so that we can progressively reor-
ganize the data blocks based on their access patterns. In this way, we can further reduce
the number of keys that the owner sends to the end user. Finally, we plan to integrate
existing approaches to access control, provable data possession, and key management for
outsourced data to develop a new approach to secure Storage-as-a-Service.
CHAPTER 3: DE-DUPLICATION VULNERABILITY AND DEFENSE
Cloud computing has at its core, virtualization. Without virtualization, cloud computing
would be too expensive to be economically feasible. Virtualization, by definition, shares
computing resources between different computing applications (such as between different
objects within a program all the way to independent Operating Systems), thus greatly in-
creasing the utilization of computing hardware. As with all cases of sharing, there can be
violations of trust. Customers may trust that a cloud computing provider is doing every-
thing possible to protect their computing environment from attack, but a malicious cus-
tomer may find ways to violate the trust in this resource sharing to gain confidential insight
into what other customer’s virtual environments are working on. A malicious customer may
also discover vulnerabilities in, or even gain complete access to, other customer’s virtual
machines.
One such attack example is described here, along with our mitigation strategies. In this
example attack, a malicious customer takes advantage of the copy-on-write security protec-
tion mechanism designed to protect user integrity while allowing the performance advan-
tages of memory de-duplication. The malicious customer uses this protection mechanism
to facility an attack on confidentiality, more specifically, to launch a “guess-and-check”
method of identifying the Operating Systems and data set contents stored in memory on
other customer’s virtual machines. Once a detailed look at this attack methodology is
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made, we demonstrate how other customers may protect themselves from this attack while
still gaining the advantages of cloud computing with acceptable performance loss.
3.1 Introduction
OS fingerprinting is an essential step for many subsequent penetration attempts and at-
tacks. Only after identifying the type and version of the OS of a system, can an attacker
determine the vulnerabilities to exploit. Traditional OS fingerprinting schemes [9, 37, 42,
80, 93] are usually interactive procedures through IP packet analysis, service querying, or
chronological exploits. Since these mechanisms usually initiate some interaction with the
target system and use the contents and delay of the network packets from the target OS
to determine its type and version, the target OS can monitor the network traffic to detect
such attempts. It can also disable the responses or generate fake packets to disguise the
fingerprinting procedure.
Additionally, with the ever increasing computation capabilities, storage space, and net-
work bandwidth, more and more scientific and military projects are starting to use very
large data sets for analysis, computation, and decision making. For example, NASA’s Earth
Observing System Data and Information System (EOSDIS) can generate two terabytes of
data each day. Because of the intellectual property, user privacy, and several other reasons,
many of these projects choose to hide the information about what data sets they are using
for analysis and computation, even when some of the data sets are public. For example, a
survey conducted in 2009 [61] shows that out of 62 groups that are requested to share their
data or data sources, only 24 groups comply. To get access to such information, attack-
ers have designed various mechanisms to compromise the operating system and database
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management system. Different schemes have been designed to defend against such attacks.
Virtual machines in the cloud also make it so mobile users can defend themselves against
traffic correlation attacks, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
The proliferation of virtual machine platforms creates a new path for non-interactive
OS and Data set fingerprinting. In a VM hypervisor, multiple virtual machines share the
same hardware platform. Although perfect isolation among VMs is required by design [99],
researchers have identified several mechanisms to break such isolation through the schemes
such as side channels. [10] For example, researchers find that the shared cache may become
a side channel for the detection of the web traffic access rate or even keystrokes of the
co-resident VM instances. [81] As another example, CCCV [70] is a system that can
create a covert channel using the CPU loads to secretly transmit information among virtual
machines.
In this research we seek to investigate OS fingerprinting [73] and data set identification
[72] in virtual machine hypervisors with the memory de-duplication functionalities en-
abled (such as VMware ESX and ESXi [101], Extended Xen [43, 110], and KSM (Kernel
Samepage Merging) [7] of the Linux kernel). The memory de-duplication technique takes
advantage of the similarity among memory pages so that only a single copy and multiple
handles need to be preserved in the physical memory, as shown in Figure 8. Here each of
the two virtual machines V M1 and V M2 needs to use three memory pages. Under the nor-
mal condition, six physical pages will be occupied by the VMs. If memory de-duplication
is enabled, we need to store only one copy of multiple identical pages. Therefore, the
two VMs can be fit into four physical pages (note that we have both inter- and intra-VM
memory de-duplication). This technique can reduce the memory footprint size of VMs
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and the performance penalty caused by memory access miss. However, it will break the
isolation among VMs and introduce new vulnerabilities of non-interactive OS and data set
fingerprinting. The objective here is to exploit the vulnerability by constructing concrete
attacks on the VMware ESXi hypervisor long side a widely used scientific visualization
software package called ParaView [18], and investigate the mechanisms to defend against
such attacks.
Figure 8: Memory de-duplication reduces the OS footprint size.
The overview of our approach is as follows. When we detect that the target VM has been
launched, we will use the mechanisms described in [81] to initiate multiple VM instances
using different OS onto the same physical box. Additionally, we will read multiple data
sets into the memory of our VM. Without losing generality, for OS fingerprinting, we call
the operating system of the target VM as St and those of the attacker’s VMs as Sa1, Sa2, · · · ,
San. The goal is to determine whether or not Sai and St are of the same type. Without losing
generality, for Data set fingerprinting, we assume that the target VM is using the data set
Dt for analysis and computation, and the data sets we open are Da1, Da2, · · · , Dan. The
intent is to determine whether or not Dai and Dt contain many identical pages. If so, we
will conclude that the target VM is actually using Dai for analysis, or running the same OS
as Sai. To achieve these goals, we will let the memory de-duplication mechanisms identify
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and merge those identical pages. Once this procedure is accomplished, we will introduce
reading and writing operations to the memory pages that are unique for each different OS
type or data set, respectfully. Since the hypervisor handles the operations differently for
those de-duplicated pages and the pages with their own copies [90], we can measure the
accumulated differences in the memory access delay to figure out whether or not Sai and St
are of the same type, or if Dai and Dt are the same file. During this procedure, the attacker’s
VMs do not need to directly interact with the target VM.
We design several mechanisms to defend against OS Fingerprinting by the hypervisor
and the guest OS respectively. At the virtual machine level, the guest OS can load the
unique memory pages belonging to other OS into its memory to obfuscate the fingerprinting
procedures. The hypervisor can monitor the behaviors of different VMs and avoid the de-
duplication of any memory pages belonging to the OS image files. More details of the
defense mechanisms will be discussed in Section 5.
The advantages of our approaches are as follows. First and most importantly, it is a non-
interactive fingerprinting procedure since during the attack we only conduct operations on
our own VM instances. This non-interactive property will prevent the target VM from de-
tecting the identification operations. Second, our experiments show that many scientific
data sets, even when they are from the same broad field, contain a large number of unique
memory pages. Reading/Writing operations to these pages can generate a measurable dif-
ference in access delay. Third, we have analyzed the memory footprint of many different
OS types and identified the memory pages that are unique to each type. Our preliminary
results show that the number of unique pages is large enough to generate a measurable
difference in access delay. Last but not least, both our experiment results on ParaView and
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our experiment results on VMware ESXi with both Windows and Linux systems show that
our respective attacks are practical. Since our OS fingerprinting approach does not conflict
with the interactive OS fingerprinting mechanisms, they can work together to improve the
detection accuracy.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the details
of the OS fingerprinting approach and our data set identification approach. We discuss the
generation of OS and data signature files and the procedures to measure the accumulated
differences in access delay. In section 3, we present the implementation of the attacks and
the experimental results when VMware ESXi hypervisor is used. During section 4, we
demonstrate our guest OS fingerprinting defense strategy with performance penalty and
defense effectiveness results. Section 5 discusses the problems such as VM co-residence
detection and other methods for the prevention of the attacks which were not experimented
with. Section 6 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Attacks through Memory Deduplication
System Assumptions and Background
In the investigated scenario, we assume that an attacker can initiate VM instances in the
same cloud infrastructure as the target VM. We also assume that through the co-residence
detection mechanisms discussed in Section 5 we can determine whether or not the target
system is running as a guest on the same physical box as the attacker’s VMs. Since the
target VM could have very sophisticated Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems in place,
it can detect any OS fingerprinting attempts through network interactions. Under this con-
dition, the attacker wants to learn what OS version the target is, without any network scans,
57
in order to exploit known vulnerabilities and conduct a direct one-hit attack before the
IDS/IPS can respond. In a data set fingerprinting attack, we assume that the attacker can
submit queries to the target VM to initiate data access for analysis and computation. The
attacker also holds some data sets and it wants to determine whether or not the target VM
is using one of these data sets to resolve the queries.
We assume the attacker has root control over the VM instances that it initiates. We also
assume the attacker’s VMs have large enough memory (such as 512MB) to avoid very
frequent page swapping. We do not assume the attacker can decide how many CPU cycles
it is allowed to use, nor do we assume the attacker can decide how much physical RAM its
VMs are allowed to consume. These are reasonable assumptions based on current industry
practice. Without losing generality, we assume that the host uses 4KB memory pages.
Since our experiments use VMware ESXi as the hypervisor, below we briefly describe
its memory de-duplication operations. A comprehensive description can be found at [103].
To avoid unnecessary delay during page loading, whenever a new memory page is read
from the hard disk, ESXi will allocate a new physical page for it. Later, ESXi will use idle
CPU cycles to locate the identical memory pages in physical RAM, and remove duplicates
by leaving pointers for each VM to access the same memory block. Hash results of the
memory page contents are used as index values to locate identical pages. To avoid false
de-duplication caused by hash collisions, a byte-by-byte comparison between the pages
will be conducted. While the reading operations to the de-duplicated pages will access
the same copy, copy-on-write is used to prevent one VM from changing another VM’s
memory pages. Specifically, on writing operations a new page will first be allocated and
copied. This procedure will incur extra overhead compared to writing to not-shared pages,
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which will lead to a measurable delay when a large number of shared pages are allocated
and copied.
ESXi uses three system wide parameters to adjust how it looks for de-duplicated pages.
These are “ShareScanTime”, “ShareScanGHz”, and “ShareRateMax”. ShareScanTime
specifies how much time the administrator would like ESXi to scan an entire VM’s mem-
ory pages for duplicates. ShareScanGHz specifies the maximum number of pages to scan
in physical RAM per second. ShareRateMax specifies how quickly the pages should be
scanned per-virtual machine. VMware sets these parameters to some default values to offer
the least amount of overhead, while still finding identical pages fairly quickly. According
to VMware, the algorithm also scans faster if it determines that there is a high likelihood
of finding duplicate pages based on the previous scans, and vice-versa.
ParaView [54] is an open-source, multi-platform data analysis and visualization software
package. ParaView allows users to generate visualizations to analyze their data using qual-
itative and quantitative techniques. ParaView is used by the organizations such as Army
Research Laboratory, Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories, and NASA.
Generation of Memory Fingerprints
The fingerprints created in the following fashion give us a real world representation to
what can be found in the wild. The off-line memory dump and analysis described in the
following two sections is also much faster, easier, and only slightly less accurate than cal-
culating what the similar memory pages would be based on the OS’s documented loading
behavior on essential OS files, and the documented loading behavior of the data analysis
software and the data files themselves, respectively. Based on these considerations, we be-
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lieve that an attacker would most likely build memory signatures in the same fashion as we
have for our approach.
Generation of OS Signatures
The first step to turn the proposed approach into a practical attack is to identify the mem-
ory pages that are unique to each OS type. To accomplish this task, we load the OS image
files into a VM instance and then conduct a memory dump. The dump files are then cut
into 4KB pages. We adopt the mechanism in [43] and use hash results of the memory con-
tents as indexes to locate the identical pages. For each OS type and version, we analyze the
memory dump files from different installation sources so that we can remove the impacts of
the factors including different hardware drivers, different product keys, and different prod-
uct IDs. Once we have categorized the memory pages by OS types and versions, we can
find out which memory pages are unique to each OS version, but present in all copies of
that OS version. These memory pages will hereafter be referred to as OS signatures. Please
note that not all memory pages can be used as the signatures. For example, the memory
dump of Windows XP SP3 contains 59,238 copies of all-zero memory pages. These pages,
however, cannot be used for OS fingerprinting since they are not unique to any specific OS
type.
During the signature generation procedures, we conduct cross-comparison among only
the memory pages of different OS types. Therefore, it is possible that some of the signature
pages will appear in the memory images of other software applications or data files. This
may affect the OS fingerprinting accuracy since the attacker would not be able to identify
the sources of these memory pages. Fortunately, because of the large number of diverse
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memory pages (24096×8 if every bit has the same probability to be 0 or 1), the impacts on
fingerprinting accuracy will be very limited.
Generation of Data File Signatures
Considering the size of the data sets for scientific and military applications, their memory
footprint often contains many pages. Some of these pages, however, cannot be used for data
set identification since they are not unique for any specific file. For example, the header
of the data files often follows a pre-defined format and contains information such as the
dimension of the data, the number of records in the file, and the size of each data record.
At the same time, the data files may also have some identical memory pages with the
operating system or user applications. To determine whether or not a data file has enough
unique memory pages, we propose to conduct off-line memory dumps of computers after
they have loaded the file. The dump file is then cut into 4KB pages and compared to
the memory pages of different operating systems and user applications. We adopt the
mechanism in [43] and use hash results of the memory contents as indexes to locate the
identical pages. Once we have categorized the memory pages of the data sets, we can find
out which memory pages are unique to each data file. These coalesced memory pages will
hereafter be referred to as data file signatures.
Fingerprinting Procedures
As we describe in Section 1, VMware ESXi uses different methods to handle the writ-
ing operations to the de-duplicated pages and pages with their own copies. For the pages
with their own copies, the writing operation can be conducted immediately. For the de-
duplicated pages, a new copy must be created first. This memory allocation and copy
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procedure will introduce extra processing delay. Our OS fingerprinting procedure, there-
fore, is to detect the accumulated difference in access delay caused by the de-duplication
between our OS signatures and the target VM. To achieve the goal, we adopt the following
schemes.
First, since we want to measure the extra processing delay caused by the writing oper-
ations to the de-duplicated pages of the data sets or operating systems, we need to control
at what time and to which pages such writing operations will be initiated. Fortunately,
for many data analysis and visualization applications such as ParaView, the data sets are
treated as read-only raw-data inputs. Likewise, since many OS files are read-only, we plan
to construct a different signature file for each OS and data set by chaining its unique mem-
ory pages together. Therefore, by loading the corresponding signature file into memory and
writing to it, we can force the hypervisor to create a new copy for any de-duplicated pages
that uniquely belong to that OS or data set.
Second, since the pages that have not been accessed recently will be swapped out by
the hypervisor, we need to distinguish the delay of hard disk reading from that of copy-on-
write. To accomplish this task, we plan to conduct a reading operation to the OS or data
set signature file right before the writing operation. If a page is in the memory, this reading
operation can be accomplished immediately and it will not change the de-duplication status
of the page. However, if a page has been swapped out, this reading operation will force
the hypervisor to execute a hard disk access. Since VMware ESXi will allocate a new
memory page for the newly read contents, the next step of writing can be accomplished
immediately and will not provide us useful information about the fingerprinting. In this
way, we can distinguish between the two types of access delay.
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With these basic components established, our OS fingerprinting procedure is illustrated
in Figure 9. Although here we use the narrative description “short” and “long”, the exper-
iments in Section 3 will help us to determine quantitative thresholds for OS and data set
fingerprinting in real systems.
Figure 9: The proposed fingerprinting procedure.
When we confirm that our VM instance and the target VM are located on the same
physical box through co-residence detection, we will read the signature files into memory.
These files will then be left alone for a period of time to allow memory de-duplication
algorithms to locate and merge the identical pages. Once the de-duplication procedure is
accomplished, we will conduct a reading operation on the signature files. The purpose of
this operation is to determine whether or not the files have been swapped out to hard disk. If
the reading access delay matches the hard disk loading time, we will abort the fingerprinting
procedure since the newly loaded pages all have their own copies. Otherwise, we will
conduct a writing operation to the signature files. Since we already know that these pages
are in memory, based on the delay of the writing operation, we can determine whether
or not they experience the copy-on-write procedures. If so, we know that a VM instance
matching this signature file exists in the physical box.
63
3.3 Implementation and Experimental Results
Although the basic idea of the proposed approach is straightforward, many issues need
to be solved before we can turn the idea into a practical attack. For example, we need
to examine the size of the OS and data set signature files to make sure that the accumu-
lated delay is actually measurable. At the same time, we need to examine the timekeeping
schemes in hypervisors so that we can measure the delay accurately. In this Section, we
present the details of our implementation of the attack and the experiment results.
OS Signature Experiment Environment Setup
Our VMware ESXi server is running on a PC with a dual core 2.4GHz Xeon CPU,
4GB RAM, and SATA hard drives. To simplify the experiment setup and examine the
practicability of the attack, during each trial there are only the target VM and our attacking
VM instance running on ESXi. OS fingerprinting in more complicated scenarios will be
studied in future work.
In order to build the OS signatures, we have generated and examined the memory dump
files of different operating systems to find memory pages that would be unique for a specific
OS version. We sampled four types of Linux/Unix and nine types of Windows to cross
examine their memory pages. The number of unique pages of each OS type/version is
summarized in Table 2. From the table, we find that the size of the signature files ranges
from several thousands to tens of thousands of pages. The experiment results presented
later will show that the accumulated difference in access delay to these pages can be easily
detected.
Another issue that we are facing is the accuracy of time measurement. Traditionally a
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computer provides three schemes to measure the length of a time duration: time of the day,
CPU cycle counter, and APIC (advanced programmable interrupt controller) timer. The
first method provides the measurement granularity of seconds which is too coarse for our
application. The second method will be a good candidate for time measurement if the at-
tacker’s OS completely owns the hardware platform. In a VM-based system, however, it
cannot accurately measure the time duration. For example, if a page fault happens during
our reading operation, the hypervisor may pause the CPU cycle counter while it fetches
the memory page. Therefore, the delay caused by hard disk reading will not be measured.
Based on these observations, we choose to use the timestamp service provided by masm32
in: \masm32\lib\winmm.lib to access the APIC timer. Specifically, we use the timeGet-
Time directive because it provides a 1 millisecond resolution. [64] According to [102],
VMware has fully emulated the local APIC timer to provide accurate time readings, so the
page fault handler built into ESXi to handle de-duplication will not pause the virtual local
APIC timer.
Table 2: Size of OS signature files in 4KB pages
OS Type
Fedora Ubuntu
7 8 10 11
# of unique pages 4572 5274 8179 5547
OS Type
Windows
XP XP 2003 Vista Vista Win 7 Win 7 2008 2008
SP2 SP3 32 bit 64 bit 32 bit 64 bit 32 bit 64 bit
# unique 3325 3582 3695 5503 20053 9753 23977 5638 16240
Three reasons make us choose Windows 95 as the OS of the attacker’s VM instance.
First, we want an operating system with a very small memory footprint size so that its
contents will not pollute the de-duplication results. Since Windows 95 can easily run on
a platform with only 64MB RAM, it achieves a good balance between the size and the
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supported functions. Second, there are not many systems still running Windows 95 so
there is a very low probability that our VM instance and the target VM are running the
same OS. Last but not least, we have extended experiences in working with the portable
executable (PE) file format and Windows 95 is one of the earliest systems supporting this
format. To further reduce extra delay caused by high level programming languages, we
implemented the memory access and time measurement functions in assembly language.
As illustrated in Figure 9, we have divided the OS fingerprinting procedure into four
groups of operations. Operation group one will read the first 32 bits of every memory page
of the OS signature file and store each result into the EAX register. Our program then sleeps
the processor for a duration of several hours to allow de-duplication to occur. After that, it
will perform operation groups two through four immediately after each other. Group two
does the same operation as group one. Group three writes junk data into the first 32 bits
of every memory page for each OS signature. Finally, group four reads back the memory
pages to confirm the changes.
OS Signature Experiment Results
We conduct six groups of experiments to evaluate the OS fingerprinting capability of the
proposed approach under different levels of computation and memory access workload.
The target OS that we try to identify includes Windows 2008 Server 32 bit, Windows 7 32
bit, and Ubuntu 10. In the attacker’s VM instance, we load the OS signature files of Win-
dows 2008 Server 32 bit, Windows 2003 Server, Windows XP Service Pack 3, Windows 7
32 bit, Ubuntu 10, and Ubuntu 11. We choose these signatures since they are the favorites
of IT staff in our day-to-day lives and would have a high probability of a hit in the real
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world. The idle periods for memory de-duplication are usually four hours. Our results are
shown in Figures 10 through 14. Given the fact that the delays span across multiple degrees
of magnitude, we use log-scale Y-axis. Seeing as the signature files of different OS types
have different sizes, we illustrate the average reading and writing time per memory page
in the figures. For a signature file that contains thousands of memory pages, the accumu-
lated difference in access delay will be several to tens of milliseconds, which can be easily
measured by the proposed approach. Each node in the figures is the average value of five
experiment runs with the same configuration. All time delays are measured in milliseconds.
To help readers to better understand the experiment results, the average access delay to the
signature file of the target OS will always be represented by “x”.
In the first experiment, we set up a baseline test case. Here one instance of Windows
2008 is initiated in the host as the target OS. To reduce the impacts of page swapping
on the approach and accelerate the de-duplication calculation procedure, the target VM
instance does not activate any other applications. The attacker’s VM runs Windows 95 and
loads the signature files of Windows 2008, 2003, XP SP3, Windows 7 32bit, Ubuntu 10,
and Ubuntu 11 into its memory. As shown in Figure 10.(a), the delay of the first reading
operations is relatively long since the pages have to be read from the hard disk. After that,
the target VM instance and the attacker’s VM are left idle for four hours to give the de-
duplication algorithms enough time to scan the memory. Given that each VM has enough
memory to hold the OS files, we do not expect a lot of page swapping to happen. This is
confirmed by the very short access delay of the second group of reading operations. The
access delay of the writing operations, however, demonstrates the difference among the
signature files. Here the access delay to the signature file of Windows 2008 is about three
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times longer than those of other OS types because of the copy-on-write operations. Our
approach can successfully identify the type of the target OS in this baseline setup. The
second experiment has the same configuration as experiment one except that the target VM
is running Ubuntu 10. As the results shown in Figure 10.(b), the long delay will allow us
to easily identify the target OS.
(a) when Windows 2008 is the target OS
(b) when Ubuntu 10 is the target OS
Figure 10: OS fingerprinting results when CPU and memory demands are low.
In the third experiment, we want to investigate the impacts of computation workload
in the target VM on the fingerprinting accuracy. Here the basic setup is the same as the
first experiment. The only difference is that we use Windows 7 32bit as the target OS. To
introduce medium-level computation workload on the target VM, we run DES encryption
and RSA encryption algorithms on the VM. The results are shown in Figure 11. Here the
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second group of reading operations become slower. This could be caused by context switch
between the VMs since the target VM is running some applications. The writing delay to
the signature files of the target OS is still much longer than those of other OS types (4 to
8 times longer). From this figure, we find that our OS fingerprinting approach will work
properly when the computation workload on the target VM is not too heavy.
Figure 11: OS fingerprinting under medium computation workload.
Figure 12: OS fingerprinting under medium level memory demand.
In the fourth experiment, we want to investigate the impacts of memory demands on the
target VM on the fingerprinting accuracy. Again we choose Windows 2008 as the OS of
the target VM. We run a memory testing software “QA+Win32” [35] to introduce medium-
level memory demand on the target VM. The results are shown in Figure 12. Here the
second group of reading operations become even slower because of the page swapping.
The write delay to the signature files of the target OS is still 2 to 3 times longer than those
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of other OS types. This figure shows that our approach can work properly under medium
level memory demand on the target VM.
Figure 13: OS fingerprinting under medium workload and memory demand.
Figure 14: OS fingerprinting under extreme workload and memory demand.
In the fifth experiment, we have medium-level computation workload and memory de-
mand on the target VM. The results are shown in Figure 13. The OS type of the target VM
can still be identified based on the slow speed of the writing operations.
In the last group of experiments, we want to investigate the OS fingerprinting accuracy
of our approach under very heavy computation workload and memory demand. We use
Windows 2008 as the OS of the target VM. The target VM is running Prime95 [106], a CPU
and RAM stress test software package. Very frequent memory page swapping is expected.
The results are shown in Figure 14. We can see that the writing delay to the signature files
of different OS types cannot be distinguished from each other. This experiment shows that
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memory de-duplication based OS fingerprinting will not work properly under extremely
heavy computation workload and memory demand. This is reasonable since under this
condition, the hypervisor would not have enough computation power or a relatively stable
memory image to identify and maintain the de-duplicated pages.
Data Set Experiment Environment Setup
Our VMWare ESXi server is running on a PC with a dual core 2.4GHz Xeon CPU, 4GB
RAM, and SATA hard drives. We have chosen two Windows Operating Systems as the
guest OSes for the target VM: Windows 7 32-bit, and Windows XP SP3. The attackers VM
is Windows 95 because it has a smaller memory footprint than modern Windows Operating
Systems. Here, having a small memory footprint prevents our attackers’ VM from requir-
ing excessive amounts of memory for loading memory page samples. We have chosen five
biological data sets available from 3D-IRCADb [34] to serve as the data files for finger-
printing and identification. A screenshot of an example data set is available in Figure 15.
We choose the five data sets available that have a signature of over 3,000 memory pages.
Their basic information is shown in Table 3.
Figure 15: Screenshot of 3D-IRCADb2.2, as used in experimentation.
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Table 3: Selected data sets.
file & size content source signature size
3D-IRCADb1.1 liver tumor 3D-IRCADb
3524 pages
(6.9MB) structure database
3D-IRCADb1.3 liver tumor 3D-IRCADb
7836 pages
(13.4MB) structure database
3D-IRCADb1.5 liver tumor 3D-IRCADb
3640 pages
(7.1MB) structure database
3D-IRCADb1.6 liver tumor 3D-IRCADb
3661 pages
(7.2MB) structure database
3D-IRCADb2.2 Chest/Abdomen 3D-IRCADb
7435 pages
(13.1MB) 3D CT-scan database
In order to build our data set signatures, we have generated and examined the memory
dump files under different scenarios. Specifically, we need to examine the memory page
contents under two conditions: (1) ParaView is initiated but no data file is opened; and
(2) ParaView has opened the data file and generated the visualization. We experiment
with different types of guest OS to investigate their impacts on the size of the signatures.
The number of unique pages of each data set is summarized in Table 3. Please note that
in this table, we have cross-compared all the memory pages of the two guest operating
systems, the memory pages of ParaView opened under different guest OS, and the pages
of the data sets. From the table, we find that the signature files usually have the size of
several thousands pages. The later experiment results will show that the accumulated delay
of accessing these pages can be easily detected. At the same time, we find that when
ParaView opens the same data file in different guest OSes, the memory dumps have many
duplicate pages. This shows that ParaView is almost OS-independent. This property will
definitely promote its wide adoption. However, it will also provide convenience to attackers
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in data set identification since the malicious parties do not need to first figure out the guest
OS of the target virtual machine.
Another issue that we are facing is the accuracy of time measurement. Traditionally an
operating system provides three methods to measure the length of a time duration: time
of the day, CPU cycle counter, and APIC timer. The first method provides the granular-
ity of seconds and it is too coarse for our application. The second method will be a good
candidate for time measurement if the OS completely owns the hardware platform. In a
VM-based system, however, it cannot accurately measure the time duration. For example,
if a page fault happens during our reading operation, the hypervisor will pause the CPU
cycle counter and switch to another VM. Therefore, the delay caused by hard disk reading
will not be measured. Based on these observations, we choose to use the timestamp ser-
vice provided by masm32 in winmm.lib to access the APIC timer. Specifically, we use the
timeGetTime directive because it provides a 1 millisecond resolution. According to [102],
VMWare has fully emulated the local APIC timer to provide accurate time readings, so
the page fault handler built into ESXi to handle de-duplication will not pause the virtual
local APIC timer. To further reduce extra delay caused by high level programming lan-
guages such as Java, we implemented the memory access and time measurement functions
in assembly.
As illustrated in Figure 9, we have divided our program’s functions into four groups of
operations. The operation group one is to immediately read the first 32 bits of each data
set signature’s memory page and store the result of each read operation in the accumulator
(EAX). Our program then sleeps the processor for a sufficient amount of time to allow
de-duplication to occur. Our program then performs operation groups two through four
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immediately after each other. Group two does the same operation as group one, but reads
the signatures after the sleep period. Group three writes junk data to the first 32 bits of
every memory page for each data set signature. Group four then reads back the memory
pages to confirm the changes.
Data Set Experiment Results
We conduct four groups of experiments to evaluate the data set identification capability
of the proposed approach under different levels of computation and memory access work-
load. We have two virtual machines running on the physical box. The operating system
of the target virtual machine is Windows XP SP3. It has the latest version of ParaView
installed. The attacker’s VM uses Windows 95 as the operating system. The target VM has
512 MB memory and the attacker’s VM has 256 MB memory. Because we have constructed
the data set signature files in the binary format, we do not need to install ParaView on the
attacker’s VM. This is preferred, because writing junk data to memory pages in actual use
by ParaView may cause the program to crash, which may be a detectable event on the hy-
pervisor. We assume that the attacker has a rough idea of what sample data sets might be
used by the target VM. In our experiments, since we have direct access to the target VM,
we will activate ParaView to operate on a single selected data set at a time. Given that the
attackers do not know which data sets the target VM is using, we will load the signature
files of all data sets into memory and conduct the reading/writing operations on each of
them.
Our results are shown in Figures 16 through 19. In addition to our 4 groups of opera-
tions, we first show in each figure the hard disk delay required to load each signature from
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disk. As the access delays span across multiple degrees of magnitude, we use log-scale
Y-axis. Because the signature files of different data sets have different sizes, we illustrate
the average reading and writing time per memory page in the figures. Each node in the
figures are the average value of five experiment runs with the same configuration. All time
delays are measured in milliseconds. To help readers better understand the identification
results, the page access delay of the data set read by ParaView on the target VM is always
represented by “x”.
Figure 16: Results with 3D-IRCADb1.1 under idle level computation workload.
In the first experiment, we set up a baseline test case. Here the ParaView software on the
target VM reads the 3D-IRCADb1.1 data set and generates the visualization. We choose
this data set as the test case since it contains the smallest number of signature pages that
still fit our 3000 page count lower limit. As shown in Figure 16, the hard disk delay is
long. Next, the first read operation is short because the pages have just been freshly loaded
into memory. After that, the target VM and the attacker’s VM are left idle to give the
de-duplication algorithms enough time to scan the memory. Since each VM has enough
memory to store the signature files, we do not expect a lot of page swapping to happen.
This is confirmed by the very short access delay of the second group of reading operations.
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The access delay of the writing operations, however, demonstrates the difference among the
signature files. Here the delay of the signature file of the 3D-IRCADb1.1 data set is about
twelve times longer than those of other data sets because of the copy-on-write operations.
Our approach can successfully identify the data set in use in this baseline setup.
Figure 17: Results with 3D-IRCADb1.1 under moderate computation workload.
For the second experiment we continued with the 3D-IRCADb1.1 data set. This time,
we also startup a Windows 7 VM and allow it to run along side the target and attacker VMs.
We repeatedly ran the System File Checker (SFC) included with Windows 7 to simulate a
normal moderate computer load by a third party Virtual Machine running on the hypervisor.
The physical machine maintained fluctuating demands on the CPU, memory, and hard disk
through the entire test. The results are shown in Figure 17. From the figure, we find that
the reading and writing delays are very similar to Figure 16. The measured writing delay
is still much longer than those of other data sets (4 to 6 times longer). From this figure, we
find that the proposed approach will work properly when the signature file is as small as
three thousand pages under normal real-world operating conditions.
In the third experiment, we want to assess what the impacts are of using a data set with
a larger signature, so we used the 3D-IRCADb1.3 data set. To introduce the impacts of
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Figure 18: Results with 3D-IRCADb1.3 under moderate computation workload.
normal CPU, memory and disk usage operations, we again run the SFC included with Win-
dows 7 in a loop during the experiment. As we describe above, the ParaView software on
the target VM reads the 3D-IRCADb1.3 data set. After the visualization is generated, we
leave the ParaView application alone to avoid extra computation and memory access over-
head caused by the software. The results are shown in Figure 18. The write delay measured
is still 2 times longer than those of other data sets. This figure shows that our approach can
work properly with larger signature data sets under normal operating conditions.
Figure 19: 3D-IRCADb1.1 with high level workload and memory demand.
In the fourth experiment, we write a script to continually change the viewing angle on
the target VM. The view point rotated between each viewing axis and back again within
one second, causing the virtual CPU to peak out at 100 percent usage, with each physical
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core maintaining about 50 percent usage. We use the 3D-IRCADb1.1 data set to see if a
smaller signature will have a noticeable access delay. The results are shown in Figure 19.
The identification of the data set in use in the target VM can still be identified with a 10
times longer writing delay.
3.4 Guest Based Prevention of Memory Deduplication Fingerprinting
As the analysis in Section 2 shows, the differences in access delay will allow attackers
to detect only the existence of specific pages in the main memory. However, they can-
not identify to which applications or data files these pages belong. Therefore, a VM can
obfuscate the attack by intentionally loading the signature files of other OS types into its
memory. Since most signature files contain only a few thousand unique memory pages, we
can easily fit multiple signatures into the main memory of a VM.
Experiment Environment Setup and Results
We set up an experiment environment identical to Section 3.1. We must first determine a
proper signature read time frequency for the defense program to use, in order to prevent the
target OS from swapping out signature files, subsequently preventing de-duplication from
masking the target’s signature. In order to do this, we used three different read frequencies:
2000 seconds, 200 seconds, and 20 seconds. Our attacker again used Windows 95 as the
attacking OS, and our target was chosen as Windows 7 because it is the most frequently
used OS at this time. On the target, we introduced a moderately high memory usage by
opening different retail web pages in Internet Explorer until there was no free memory and
the disk cache was down to 300MB. We then refreshed each web page in serial 10 second
loops. We noticed during our experiment that the CPU usage chart became highly unstable,
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but should not interfere much with this experiment. Our attack results are shown in Figure
20.
Figure 20: Defense results under different orders of magnitude.
These results show an inverse correlation between signature read frequency and attacker
detection accuracy. This is the be expected because the target OS will have a better
chance of swapping signature pages out with longer signature read wait times, thus not
de-duplicating as many signature pages and increasing the attacker’s accuracy. In order to
avoid this problem, our defense experiments and performance analysis will be done with a
2 second read wait time.
For our defense vs. no defense comparison experiments, our attacker again used Win-
dows 95 as the attacking OS, and our target was Windows XP Service Pack 3. We chose
Windows XP because it is easier to more precisely control cpu and memory variables to
alleviate the unstable cpu usage seen in Windows 7. We conduct two groups of experiments
to evaluate the OS fingerprinting defense capability of the proposed approach under differ-
ent levels of computation and memory access workload. In the attacker’s VM instance, we
load the OS signature files of Windows 2008 Server 32 bit, Windows 2003 Server, Win-
dows XP Service Pack 3, Windows 7 32 bit, Ubuntu 10, and Ubuntu 11. The attacker wrote
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these signature files into their virtual machine’s memory and waited five hours before trying
to write to these pages. The target wrote these same signature files into their memory and
read them every two seconds to make sure they were not swapped out by either the guest
or the hypervisor. An experiment was not conducted for both high CPU and High Memory
demand because, as shown in Figure 14, the attack does not work under these conditions
anyways.
In experiment group one, the memory signature write times were taken by the attacker
with both no defense and the defense program running in the target VM. The target VM
was left idle, other than the defense program running. The results are shown in Figure
21. As is shown, before the defense, the attacker could successfully identify the operating
system version running on the target VM. However, with the defense program running, the
attacker is now no longer able to successfully detect the target VM’s Operating System.
Figure 21: Page write results with and without defense under idle workload.
In experiment group two, the memory signature write times were taken by the attacker
with both no defense and the defense program running in the target VM. The target VM
was running Prime95, instructed to use very little ram or disk. The CPU in the virtual
machine stayed very near 100 percent usage the entire wait time. The results are presented
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in Figure 22. Here, we can see that the memory write time for XP decreased without the
defense program running from Figure 21 to Figure 22. We believe this was due to a slight
decrease in the efficiency of the de-duplication engine in the hypervisor due to the large
CPU workload. With the defense program running, the write times for all signatures went
up as expected, with a slight dip in the middle, again, most likely due to a decrease in
the de-duplication efficiency. Despite this decrease, the defense program does successfully
mask the correct operating system signature.
Figure 22: Write results with/without defense; high CPU/low memory usage.
Performance analysis of VM with defense program running.
In order to assess the performance impact of our defense program, we ran our defense
program on a Microsoft SQL server configured Windows 7 guest VM and tested the mem-
ory performance when assigned 1.5 GB of memory. Windows 7 was chosen because it
has the highest idle memory demands of all the other OS signatures we made. To evalu-
ate a non-idle SQL server, we ran SQL stress tests on the server at the same time. These
stress tests simulated ten users submitting typical queries such as ”SELECT TOP 1024,”
”INSERT” and ”DELETE.” We conducted our test with first without any defenses, second
with our defense programming running and no antivirus, and third without our defense pro-
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gram and Avast! version 8.0.1483. We included the results of the SQL performance test
with antivirus running to compare with a known user acceptable performance penalty. Our
results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Averages of SQL Memory Performance Measurements.
Before Defense or Avast! After Defense After Avast!
Cache Faults/sec 0 0.2105 1.6549
Page Faults / sec 63.0820 66.4911 102.6774
Page Reads/sec 0.0294 0.01754 0.0909
Pool Paged Bytes 85449089 84826606 102458806
% Committed Bytes In Use 79.6416 92.1890 82.01443
As is shown from these results, there is a slight performance penalty, but all the values are
negligible except for “Percent Committed Bytes In Use.” This value simply represents the
percentage of memory in use by all processes. This value goes up a reasonable amount
when containing six OS signatures, so we feel it proves to be of an reasonable performance
impact in comparison to the security offered. An attack on an operating system that is
successful without any detection is the worst nightmare of a security professional. Our
defense program provides less of a performance impact than many signature based antivirus
products, which have become a staple in the defense arsenal for any computer system. The
programming of our defense program in assembly made it have no noticeable impact on
the processor, and only a slight penalty to the OS memory management. We feel defense
programs written in this way could easily become standard practice for security conscious
virtual machine operators (such as mobile cloud users).
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3.5 Discussion
The problem of VM instance co-residence detection
Although the experimental results in Section 4 are very encouraging, one problem is left
unsolved: how can the attacker put the malicious VM instance onto the same physical box
as the target and determine their co-residence. There exist two adversarial strategies to
place attacker’s VM onto the same physical box as the target. The first strategy is brute-
forcing placement. In this mechanism, the attacker will launch numerous instances over
a period of time and conduct co-residence test discussed below. Previous research [81]
shows that this simple approach has about 10% probability to successfully put at least one
VM of the attacker onto the same physical box as the target. In the second attack strategy,
the attacker can attempt to use the strong sequential and parallel placement locality of VM
instances that has been shown in third party clouds such as Amazon EC2. [81] With this
property, if attackers launch VM instances relatively soon after the launch of the target,
they have a better chance to achieve co-existence.
We understand that different VM management systems have different mapping policies
among the virtual machines and physical boxes. For example, some systems use static
mapping between the two groups. Under this condition, we can use the information such
as the Dom0 IP addresses and internal IP addresses in the cloud to determine whether or
not two instances are on the same physical box. Such management policy will also allow
us to launch a new instance immediately after the termination of our previous instance so
that the new one will take the slot of the terminated one.
The dynamic mapping between the VMs and physical boxes may even help attackers
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on their fingerprinting procedures. For example, to maximize the benefits of memory de-
duplication, the hypervisors may move all instances with the same OS type onto a single
physical box. Under this condition, the attacker only needs to use the co-residence detection
schemes to determine whether or not its VM is on the same physical box as the target.
Attackers can use two groups of mechanisms to verify co-residence of their malicious
VM and the target. In the first group the attacker can examine the similarity of their Dom0
IP addresses and internal IP addresses in the cloud since many third party cloud manage-
ment systems use static mapping between the addresses of VMs and the physical boxes.
In the second group attackers can investigate load-based co-residence detection schemes
through side-channels. [81, 76] The basic idea is to induce different levels of computation
and data access loads onto the target and measure the operation delay of attacker’s VM
instance. If the two sequences of events match very well, the two VMs have a good chance
to be located on the same physical box.
Porting the attack to other hypervisors
Although we implement and evaluate the proposed attack using only the VMware ESXi
hypervisor, the technique can be easily ported to other hypervisors that support memory de-
duplication. For example, researchers [90] have examined information leakage caused by
memory de-duplication in Linux KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging). In their experiments,
attackers construct memory pages that have the same contents as some specific applica-
tions. They will then measure the write access time to these pages to determine whether
or not the applications are initiated in the target VM. In [43], memory harvesting using
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de-duplication is implemented in Xen. Therefore, the similar attack can be conducted in
this environment with minor changes.
Other Prevention Methods of de-duplication based fingerprinting
Prevention of OS fingerprinting at the hypervisor level
Special mechanisms can also be designed to defend against the de-duplication based
OS fingerprinting attacks at the hypervisor. We propose two mechanisms which can be
adopted by the hypervisor to defend against the studied attacks. First, the hypervisor can
label the memory pages so that the de-duplication operations can be conducted on only the
pages of data files but not OS images. The disadvantages of this mechanism include the
required modification to existing hypervisors and the reduced memory usage efficiency. In
the second mechanism, physical isolation among the VMs will be enforced so that only
mutually trusted VMs will be positioned in the same physical box. For example, Amazon
introduces a new service with physically isolated, tenant-specific hardware so that NASA
will join its cloud infrastructure. [89] In [112], researchers have designed a scheme to help
end users to verify the physical isolation among VMs.
Prevention of Data Set Fingerprinting
Since the proposed data set identification mechanism uses the access delay to the mem-
ory pages to identify their contents, the defense mechanisms need to hide the difference.
Two approaches can be used to achieve the goal. In the first approach, we can combine the
unique pages of different data sets to construct a data file. When a VM instance tries to
defend against the fingerprinting attack through memory de-duplication, it can periodically
read the data file into its memory. In this way, the instance will demonstrate the signatures
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of multiple data sets and raise the difficulty level of identification. Please note that this
approach can only defer the attack but not totally disable it since the real data set in use
will still be in memory.
In the second approach, we can change the organization of the data records in the mem-
ory when they are loaded from the hard disk. In this mechanism, we can adopt different
indexing schemes to organize the data records in the main memory. Therefore, even when
the same data file is read at different VMs, the memory pages will still have different
contents. The flexibility in data organization will not introduce too much overhead in in-
formation processing and analysis since many software packages such as MS SQL server
are designed to support multiple logical equivalent plans for query processing. [77]
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we propose a new OS and data set fingerprinting mechanism for VM
instances on hypervisors that enable the memory de-duplication functionality. Memory
de-duplication will make it so mobile mashups who use virtual machines to better secure
the end users can run several of the mobile virtual machines on a single host. However,
this strategy must be properly secured. The analysis shows that the reading and writing
delay of the memory pages will demonstrate a measurable difference when they do not
have their own copies in the memory. Experimental results on multiple OS types show that
each of these OS contains a large number of unique pages that can be used as its signature.
Additionally, experimental results on multiple biological data sets show that each of these
sets contains a large number of unique pages that can be used as its signature. We can
use the co-residence detection schemes to launch VM instances onto the same physical
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box as the target and determine its OS type or the data set in use. Different from previous
approaches that need interaction with the target, our approach is more difficult to detect
by IDS or network traffic monitor. Our defense program proves that a virtual machine can
defend itself from deduplication based fingerprinting.
CHAPTER 4: PRESERVING DATA QUERY PRIVACY IN MOBILE MASHUPS
4.1 Introduction
With the proliferation of smart wireless devices such as Android and Apple phones, nu-
merous new widgets based on the widely adopted Web 2.0 standard are developed. Among
these applications, many are built upon the mashup technique. A mashup application is a
system which combines the local contents with the information from other web providers,
such as Google, Ebay, and Craigslist into an integrated information presentation platform.
The published web service interfaces such as Google Maps, Yahoo! Flickr, and Amazon
Web Services greatly simplify the creation of the mashups by hiding their internal com-
plexity.
While the mashup technique enables the development of new and convenient applica-
tions, it also raises security concerns. Previous research has been focusing on the pre-
vention of information leakage among data/service providers in the same mashup pages.
[29, 92, 98, 108] In this chapter, we investigate the security problem from a new perspec-
tive. As an example, a health care service delivering company develops a mobile mashup:
a patient needs to input only an address and a disease. The mashup will search in the com-
pany’s database to locate all doctors specialized in this disease within 10 miles of the input
address. It will then retrieve information from two other providers to label these doctors
on a map and show their patient reviews. The company knows that the privacy of health
88
information is critical. Therefore, it encrypts the query results from the database. Unfortu-
nately, the map and doctor review companies transmit information in plain text. Now if an
attacker Eve monitors the returned data of this mashup to Alice’s cell phone, she can easily
derive the disease that Alice might have. This kind of information leakage is beyond the
control of the developer of this mashup since she/he cannot determine the interface design
of the data providers.
In parallel to the development of mobile mashups is the design and deployment of mobile
cloud computing. [33, 46] Mobile cloud provides transparent services to portable devices
such as smart phones in order to resolve the discrepancy between the limited resources
of such devices and the demands of innovative applications. While the security of mobile
cloud has attracted interests from researchers [45, 111], using it to provide security services
for other application environments deserves more efforts. At least three reasons make us
believe that mobile cloud is an appropriate solution to privacy preservation in mashups.
First, with cloud based storage providers offering to keep private information available de-
spite company technology failures and enable fast storage retrieval from anywhere in the
world with worldwide distributed storage, mobile users will easily be able to supplement
their small data storage capabilities with cloud based storage. Thus preventing a lost smart-
phone from providing sensitive information to third parties. Second, mobile cloud provides
transparent services to end users so that we can hide the sources of aggregated information.
Third, mobile cloud allows components of the mashup software to move freely between
end users and cloud infrastructure. In this way, it becomes more difficult for attackers to
track the information flow and/or gather private information.
Although the client-side mashup technique has dominated mashups for desktop com-
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puters, recent research [2] shows that for mobile devices client-side, server-side, and even
hybrid mashups are all popular. Therefore, in this chapter we propose to design two mech-
anisms for privacy preservation in data acquirement for client-side and server-side mashups
respectively. For server-side mashups, the server can dynamically create virtual machines
in the mobile cloud to work as proxies to handle information collection and integration.
The nondeterministic location of a virtual machine makes it extremely difficult for attack-
ers to eavesdrop on the communication contents. For client-side mashups, we propose to
use the techniques described in [22, 25] to decompose the application into multiple compo-
nents and move the data collection and aggregation part into the cloud. The overhead and
safety of both approaches will also be studied.
The contributions of the chapter can be summarized as follows. First, we explore us-
ing mobile cloud to improve information privacy in mobile mashups. Second, we have
designed different mechanisms for both client-side and server-side approaches so that they
can be integrated with various widgets. Last but not least, we study both security and
performance of the proposed approaches to evaluate their potential for wide deployment.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will discuss the
related work. In Section 3 we will present the details of the proposed approaches and their
application environments. Section 4 will investigate the performance and security of the
approaches. Finally, Section 5 will conclude this chapter.
4.2 Related Work
As summarized in [30], previous research on security in mashup applications focuses
on preventing information leakage among multiple sub-frames belonging to different in-
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formation sources. The approaches can be classified into three groups. In the first group,
researchers define the “object-capability” languages in which access control, message pass-
ing, and object reference are all tightly managed. For example, Caja [67] implements a
subset of javascript to protect third party contents in web applications. The second group
use the concept of sandboxing. They first encapsulate information from each source with a
subspace. Specially designed communication channels are then implemented among these
components. Subspace [48] and WebJail [98] are examples of the approaches. In the third
group, a complete set of communication protocols are implemented so that all sub-frames
must communicate with each other through the protocols. OMOS [108, 109] and SMash
[29] are examples of the approaches.
Using proxy-based approaches to preserve privacy in networks has been investigated
in different environments. For example, both Crowds [78] and Hordes [86] use proxies
to defend against traffic analysis attacks in Internet. Similar technique has been adopted
to achieve anonymity in HTTP requests [38], peer-to-peer networks [85], location based
services [12], and authorization and accounting [69], to name a few. The techniques of
cloud and virtualization make the dynamic establishment and maintenance of a proxy very
easy.
Decomposing a web application into multiple components and moving some of them
into cloud can serve different purposes of mobile computing. The early models such as
Click modular router [55], Dryad [47], and IBM SPL [44] all enable an application to
be composed by connecting modules. Both CloneCloud [22] and MAUI [25] focus on
reducing energy consumption by moving some components of an application into the cloud.
In [60], the authors propose a composition approach to rich mobile application development
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to promote modular, flexible and configurable widgets, and reuse of independent software
components.
In [3] the researchers investigate how to improve the application and session layers of
mashup-to-browser communications so that they can enable data sharing between providers
while still preserving the user privacy. This research does not investigate safety of the
user-to-mashup-to-data provider communication links, nor does it acknowledge a possible
correlation between these communication pathways that an attacker could take advantage
of.
In [4] the authors focus on securing the link between end users and mashup content
providers. The approach can also defend against cross site scripting and cross site request
forgery attacks. In [11] the authors investigate solutions to preventing a malicious wid-
get used by a mashup interface from gathering information about mobile users. They also
investigate malicious widgets communicating with the network in a manner that appears
as though the user’s web browser itself is using the communication link. Our proposed
work focuses more on network traffic vulnerabilities presented by mashup providers inad-
vertently turning themselves into “web traffic funnels”, and thus, becoming a very enticing
target for malicious parties.
4.3 The Proposed Approaches
In this section, we present the details of the proposed approaches. We will first elabo-
rate on the system assumptions and the attacker model. We will then discuss the privacy
preservation procedures for server-side and client-side mashups respectively.
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System Assumptions and Attacker Model
Figure 23 illustrates the application scenarios that we need to protect. In this environ-
ment, end users depend on mashups through mobile cloud to get the needed data and ser-
vices. Some of the providers may reside in the cloud, while others are not. The figure shows
both server-side and client-side mashup applications. The mashup engine is in charge of
the collection and integration of returned data. We assume that end users have enough
computation power to support secure encryption algorithms so that they can protect confi-
dentiality of the traffic. However, neither the end users nor the server has any control over
the communication standard with the third party providers. They must follow the exposed
interfaces of the data providers. Therefore, it is possible that a data provider chooses to
return data in plain text and any eavesdropper will be able to understand the contents.
We assume the attacker model described in [62] and make some updates to it. Here
an attacker will be able to eavesdrop on the incoming and outgoing traffic of the mobile
end users. If a mashup server is used and it has a fixed position and static IP address in
the infrastructure, the attacker will be able to eavesdrop on the node as well. The attacker
does not have the computation power to compromise the secure encryption algorithms and
recover the contents. In theory, for a dynamically created virtual machine in the mobile
cloud, the attacker could trace and locate the node, launch a co-residence attack [81, 112],
and steal information from the VM through side-channel attacks. [73] However, the analy-
sis in subsequent subsections will show that the difficulty level and overhead of such attacks
are very high. Therefore, we assume that the attackers cannot eavesdrop on a dynamically
created virtual machine in the mobile cloud even if its IP address is known.
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Figure 23: Mashup scenarios in mobile cloud.
k-anonymity [91] is a popular technique for hiding the target in a crowd in order to
preserve privacy. This technique, however, is not efficient in the investigated scenarios. If
the chosen value of k is too small, the privacy of end users will not be properly protected.
On the contrary, if k is too large, too much overhead will be introduced. For client-side
mashups, a mobile device has to consume valuable power resources to send out k−1 fake
requests. Since some providers will charge the mashup engine for every submitted request,
this approach could also be costly for server-side mashups. Based on this analysis, we find
that a new mechanism must be designed for privacy preservation in this application.
Privacy Preservation for Server-side Mashups
As described in section 3.1, an attacker can eavesdrop on the network traffic of the
mashup server if it has a fixed position and static IP address. However, it becomes much
more difficult to locate and monitor a dynamically created virtual machine in the mobile
cloud. In this part, we will design a mechanism based on this observation.
Figure 24 illustrates the proposed mechanism to protect information privacy in server-
side mashups. Here instead of letting the mashup server directly connect to the data and
service providers, we request it to initiate multiple virtual machines in the cloud to serve
as proxies. Since the VMs are created by the server, it can determine the communication
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Figure 24: Privacy preservation for server-side mashups.
methods with the VMs. Therefore, secure encryption algorithms can be used to protect
network traffic on this segment. Note that traffic between the proxies and data providers
could still be transmitted as plain text.
Through monitoring the outgoing traffic from the server, attackers can figure out the IP
addresses of the proxies. However, eavesdropping on the proxies will be a very difficult
job that demands a lot of resources from the attackers. Experiments in [81] show that the
attackers need to launch 40 to 80 virtual machines to achieve co-residence with one of the
proxies if the mobile cloud provider does not adopt any VM placement policies to prevent
cartography. This number could be even larger if the owner of the cloud randomly places
VMs in the infrastructure.
Even after putting a malicious VM onto the same physical box as a proxy, the attacker
still faces the challenge to derive out the network traffic of the proxy through side channel
attacks. Please note that this is different from the cross VM private key extraction attack
[113] in the following aspects. First and most importantly, in [113] the attacker must be
able to remotely and repeatedly activate the encryption algorithm in the target VM and put
the secret key into cache. In our scenario, the mashup procedure is initiated by the end
user as a one-time execution so the attacker has no control over its happening. Second,
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in [113] the attacker knows exactly where the key will reside in the cache through code
analysis. In our scenario, the returned information for the mashup could be put at any place
in the cache. Last but not least, in [113] the attacker must be able to regain control of
the CPU sufficiently frequently to conduct side-channel observations through the trigger of
Inter-Processor Interrupts (IPI). Such functionality may not be enabled in the mobile cloud
environment.
The mashup server can create multiple VM proxies to further increase the difficulty
for the attackers to trace and intercept network traffic. Here we propose two dispatching
mechanisms for the server to place requests from end users to different proxies. In the
“vertical” dispatching scheme, every request from a mobile user will be treated as a separate
transaction and assigned to a single proxy. Round-robin or least workload based placement
can be used to maintain balance among the proxies. The advantage of this approach is that
when the server determines to terminate a proxy, we can stop assigning new requests to it.
Therefore, the switch to a new proxy can be accomplished smoothly.
In the “horizontal” dispatching scheme, each proxy will be in charge of handling all
interaction with one or a few data providers. In this way, every user request needs the col-
laboration of multiple proxies and only the server itself can integrate the returned data. The
advantage of this approach is that when an attacker intercepts the network traffic to a proxy,
it can get access to only a part of the mashup result. At the same time, since there could be
many returned messages from the same provider, the attacker will not be able to identify
the request that it is interested in. The disadvantage, however, is that a malfunctioned proxy
may impact the processing of a large number of user requests. The designer of a mashup
application needs to choose the dispatching mechanism that fits her/his needs the best.
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Privacy Preservation for Client-side Mashups
In theory, we can adopt a similar technique to protect the privacy of information in
client-side mashups. Here each mobile device can initiate a virtual machine in the mobile
cloud and use it as a proxy to handle information integration. However, products such
as Mobile Virtualization Platform (MVP) by VMware cannot yet provide full control of a
virtual environment through an app on a thin client such as a smart phone. Therefore, we
need to design some new mechanisms to protect client-side mashups.
Although the technique to control multiple VM proxies through a thin mobile client
has not become mature, partitioning the execution of a mobile application and outsourcing
some operations into the cloud has become a practical solution. [22, 25] In this chapter, we
propose to build an approach upon CloneCloud. [22] The basic idea is shown in Figure 25.
Figure 25: CloneCloud based privacy preservation.
In this approach, the mobile device will host an application level virtual machine such as
JVM, Microsoft .NET, or the DalvikVM in Android to execute the mashup application. The
VM will contain a partitioning and migration management component. When the mashup
application is ready to pull information from providers, the partitioner will suspend the
execution on the mobile device, and migrate the thread to a device clone that is hosted in the
cloud. The migrated thread will execute on the clone to acquire and integrate information
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from different providers. Eventually, the thread will return to the mobile device and merge
the remotely created states into the original process.
Different from the mechanism described in Section 3.2, this approach does not depend
on a static server. On the contrary, the VM clone is a service provided by the mobile cloud
and it can be hosted by any physical box in the cloud. The mobile device can execute the
mashup in an application level VM until the information acquirement phase. It will then
package the states of the VM and port it to its clone in the cloud. Since a mobile user can
randomly choose the placement of its clone, it is very difficult for an attacker to intercept
the mashup traffic unless it can eavesdrop on the whole cloud simultaneously. Since the
thread migration traffic is encrypted, the attacker will not learn anything by monitoring the
inbound and outbound traffic of the mobile user.
Most functionality needed for this approach can be found in the implementation of
CloneCloud. We can choose the start position of thread migration in the mashup appli-
cation so that all communication with the data providers is conducted by the clone VM.
The functionalities of suspension, porting, resume, and merge have been included in the
DalvikVM of Android. Since the mobile end users can randomly choose machines in the
cloud to host their clones, we do not expect unbalanced workload to occur frequently. A
machine in the cloud can reject the migration request if it does not have enough resources
to host another application level VM.
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4.4 Experiment Results and Evaluation
In this Section, we will present the evaluation efforts and the experiment results. We will
focus on the changes in computation and communication overhead in both mobile devices
and servers. We will also study power consumption of the proposed approaches.
Server-side Mashups
The proxy based approach has no impact on the computation or communication overhead
at the mobile devices since all operations are conducted by the server. The end users, how-
ever, could expect a longer delay that is introduced by the extra communication segment.
The extra overhead at the server comes from the following aspects. First, the server needs
to initiate, manage, and terminate the proxy VMs in the cloud. Second, to prevent attack-
ers from eavesdropping on the server, it has to encrypt the communication traffic with the
proxies. When the server handles many requests simultaneously, the increased CPU usage
could impact the system performance. Last, depending on the adopted dispatching algo-
rithm for proxies, the server may need to integrate returned data from different providers to
generate the mashup results.
To assess the overhead in real networks, we setup an evaluation environment. The
mashup server is a Ubuntu virtual machine with 1GB of RAM and an allotment of two
processors from a Dell Optiplex 980. We choose the open source mashup WSO2 as the
application so that we can easily change its configuration. The mashup server’s Internet
connection was 1.47Mbps down and 490Kbps up. The proxies were running on remote
servers with VMWare ESXi as the hypervisor. Each proxy was assigned one processor
with 512 MB of RAM, using an Internet connection with 9.59Mbps down and 1.34Mbps
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up. All connections for the mashup server to data providers on the Internet were routed
through the remote proxies either encrypted with Blowfish (128 bit key size) or in plain
text, both by point-to-point links in OpenVPN. Experiments show that a 19-hop path exists
between our server and the proxies. Our evaluation focuses on the increase in delay that is
introduced by the communication segment between the mashup server and the proxies.
Table 5 shows the transmission and processing delay that is measured at the end user.
It represents the time duration between the sending of a request and the return of corre-
sponding mashup results. The decryption delay at the end user is not included since it is
not impacted by our approach. The average amount of returned traffic from data providers
is approximately 700KB. To better differentiate the delays caused by communication and
computation overhead, we conduct three groups of experiments. In the first group, the
mashup server will directly connect to the data providers and retrieve information. This is
the baseline case. In the second group, the mashup server will retrieve data with the help
of proxies that are hosted in the cloud. However, the data traffic between the proxies and
mashup server is not encrypted. In the last group, the proxies will encrypt the returned data
and then deliver it to the mashup server. 250 experiments for each group are conducted at
different time in a weekday.
Table 5: Delay of proxy-based server-side mashup.
Measured delay (ms) 95% Confidence
maximum minimum average min max
baseline case 820 274 292.5 292.21 292.96
proxy w/o encryption 1890 519 613 612.22 614.08
proxy with encryption 1954 523 615 614.54 616.32
From the table we find that the proposed approach roughly doubles the waiting time of
the end user. This is mainly caused by the long path between the mashup server and proxies.
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Comparing the second and third groups of experiments, we find that the communication
delay between the mashup server and proxies dominates the increase in response time. The
encryption/decryption of the returned data does not impact the delay to a large extent thanks
to the computation resources available to the servers. This is very different from the results
in the next section when a mobile device has to conduct such operations. We also notice
that the values of the average delay and minimum delay are not far from each other, which
means that most end users will experience a relatively small increase in waiting time when
the proposed approach is adopted.
Client-side Mashups
For client-side mashups, most overhead introduced by the proposed approach will be
put upon mobile devices. Therefore, we need to carefully evaluate its impacts on these
thin clients before this approach can be widely deployed. Since modern mobile devices are
usually equipped with extension storage slots such as microSD cards, we do not expect the
increase in storage overhead to cause a problem. In the following discussion, we will focus
on the increases in communication overhead and delay, computation overhead during the
migration of the application level VM, and power consumption.
Figure 26: CloneCloud based data acquirement procedure.
Figure 26 illustrates the data acquirement procedure through clonecloud. The steps with
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solid underlines (steps 1, 2, 3, and 5) are new operations that will introduce extra overhead.
Below we evaluate the overhead from different aspects.
The majority of the communication overhead comes from the migration and return of
the application level VM states (steps 3 and 5). For our experiment, we obtain a Sam-
sung Captivate smartphone and flash it with Cyanogenmod 10. We then setup a dual core
computer with an AndroVM virtual machine. We ran two client mashup programs, Land-
mark Manager and EarthAlbum. Landmark Manager is a program which shows the user
a Google map satellite image of a city, overlaid with frequently visited landmarks in that
city. It pulls its data from a number of sources such as google.com, googlehosted.com, gg-
pht.com, skyhookwireless.com, amazonaws.com, gms-world.net and doubleclick.net. The
data collected from these sources is approximately 700KB. EarthAlbum is a program that
displays a Google map satellite image of the globe, and permits the user to tap a location.
When a location is tapped, flickr.com images are displayed of the area. In our experiment
environment, we used a WIFI connection. Using this WIFI connection, the phone was
rated at 371KB/s download and 522 KB/s upload. Our communication and computation
overhead results are shown in Table 6.
To defend against eavesdropping attacks from malicious nodes, data traffic between the
mobile device and its clone must be encrypted, so encryption and decryption of upload
and download results are factored in with the rendering time. As can be seen in Table 6,
performance either increases or goes down only slightly. We expect users to see approxi-
mately the same or better performance, based on how much processing power the mashup
application requires vs. the size of the mashed up result.
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Table 6: Measured Delays with and without CloneCloud expectation.
Up AndroVM Down Render CloneCloud Autonomously
Landmark
Manager 6.7 s 25.5 s 13.3 s 7 s 52.5 s 82.6 s
Earth Album 0.62 s 6.09 s 0.81 s 1 s 8.52 s 7.89 s
Table 7: Measured Power Consumption with and without CloneCloud expectation.
Up Down Render/Encrypt CloneCloud Autonomously
Landmark
Manager 0.0298% 0.0418% 0.25523% 0.33% 0.56%
Earth Album 0.0027% 0.0026% 0.1218% 0.13% 0.15%
Since the most valuable resource for mobile devices is energy, we must carefully assess
the power consumption of the proposed approach. The increases in power consumption
come from two aspects: (1) the transmission and receiving of the VM migration states, and
(2) encryption/decryption of the acquired data. Table 7 shows our results. From this table,
it can be see that in both cases, the power consumption is expected to go down when using
CloneCloud as opposed to the phone operating autonomously.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the problem of privacy preservation for mobile mashups. Since
end users do not have control over the communication protocols with the data providers,
new mechanisms must be designed to defend against eavesdropping attacks. For server-side
mashups in mobile clouds, we propose to use a proxy based approach to protect confiden-
tiality of the communication between the mashup server and data providers. Experiments
in cloud environments show that except for the lengthened response time, other aspects of
the application performance are not impacted. For client-side mashups, we use live migra-
tion of application level virtual machines into mobile clouds to hide the data acquirement
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and aggregation procedures from eavesdroppers. We investigate the computation, commu-
nication, and power consumption overhead of the approach.
An immediate extension to this chapter is to explore the integration of the two approaches
so that application developers and end users do not have to explicitly distinguish server-
side mashups from client-side applications. A uniform approach would further reduce the
difficulty of its wide deployment and adoption.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we solve the most important security problems, at this time, with
cloud computing. More specifically the problems most at risk in cloud computing as
is needed to facilitate mobile devices in the very near future. Mobile cloud computing
promises to supplement the limited computing and power available to mobile devices to
enable them to deliver nearly the same computing resources as desktop computers attached
to local organizational networks, but from anywhere and with less down time. This always
globally available aspect introduces new security problems that must be addressed. We
have focused on:
1. Flexible cryptography-based access control of outsourced data.
2. Methods for securing virtual machines from OS and Data Fingerprinting.
3. Securing mobile-to-cloud-to-provider communications.
Flexible cryptography-based access control of outsourced data is delivered by using
hierarchical-based key management in owner-write-users-read applications. We propose
to encrypt every data block with a different key so that flexible cryptography-based access
control can be achieved. Through the adoption of the key derivation method, the owner
needs to maintain only a few secrets. We propose to store the metadata with the blocks so
that multiple key derivation hierarchies can be established for different access patterns to
reduce the processing overhead of the data access requests. Analysis shows that the key
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derivation procedure based on hash functions will introduce very limited overhead. We pro-
pose to use over-encryption and/or lazy revocation to prevent revoked users from getting
access to updated data blocks. A new key management mechanism has yet to be designed
to satisfy many-write-many-read applications. Recognizability of current access patterns
in specific applications for optimized key management must also be designed and tested.
We have both proposed a new memory deduplication based OS and data set fingerprint-
ing attack technique and delivered methods for securing virtual machines from this attack.
By loading samplings of OS signatures into memory, we have proven it possible to thwart
memory deduplication based OS fingerprinting in publicly available cloud computing envi-
ronments with minimum performance impact through experimentation on VMware ESXi.
The process of realigning the memory page content of data sets per application launch was
proposed which, once enabled on memory consuming data set applications, should easily
prevent data set fingerprinting without any degradation in performance. This defense could
be further extended through enabling the hypervisor to be aware of this attack, and enabling
it to inject random memory delays in known OS signatures, or alert the operator as to the
attempt to deduplicate multiple OS signatures within a single VM.
Finally, we have explored securing mobile-to-cloud-to-provider communications. We
have explored different mechanisms based on either server-side or client-side mashups. For
server-side mashups, we proposed separating the roles of “mashing up the data” and gath-
ering the data from external providers onto geographically separated virtual machines and
presented the performance penalties from this solution through experimentation with vir-
tual machines on separate ISPs. For client-side mashups, we proposed live migration of the
mashup application to mobile cloud based virtual machines for the purposes of data gath-
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ering and computation. We also investigate the computation, communication, and power
consumption overhead of this approach. An immediate extension to this research is to ex-
plore the integration of the two approaches so that application developers and end users
do not have to explicitly distinguish server-side mashups from client-side applications. A
uniform approach would further reduce the difficulty of its wide deployment and adoption.
Cloud computing, and most especially mobile cloud computing, are technologies that
are still evolving to fill the “niches” in industry where they can best solve problems or
make computing resources more efficient. This primarily industry driven technology has
yet to fulfill its full potential. Every step of the way, new security problems will arise that
must be addressed. After my graduation, the research on how to better optimize defenses
to the primary security problems addressed in this paper will continue. Both myself and
others at UNC Charlotte will continue developing cloud computing security solutions that
better address these problems from which many of the existing and ever changing cloud
computing providers and end users can use to provide a safer cloud computing experience
for all.
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